Charting a New Course in Cuba? Why the Time is Now to Settle Outstanding American Property Claims by Dueñas, Marco Antonio
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 43 | Issue 2 Article 11
6-1-2018
Charting a New Course in Cuba? Why the Time is
Now to Settle Outstanding American Property
Claims
Marco Antonio Dueñas
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Courts Commons, Dispute Resolution and
Arbitration Commons, International Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Legal
Remedies Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Marco A. Dueñas, Charting a New Course in Cuba? Why the Time is Now to Settle Outstanding American Property Claims, 43 Brook. J.
Int'l L. 545 (2018).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol43/iss2/11
CHARTING A NEW COURSE IN CUBA?
WHY THE TIME IS NOW TO SETTLE
OUTSTANDING AMERICAN PROPERTY
CLAIMS
76Jisjas onQe tJe mano' oM one oM tJe Mo&' Me&OaH la'ons oM tJe
Isle of Pines. If I am not mistaken, he is at this moment enjoy-
inL Jis 'eti'ement in Siami^51
INTRODUCTION
n Rej qea'’s [%e G=A>b tJe 4niteO 8tates-backed Cuban
dictator Fulgencio Batista2 notoriously fled Havana and
escaped to the Dominican Republic, allegedly looting as much as
.?\\ miHHion 48r jo'tJ oM a't anO moneh M'om tJe Qo&nt'h’s
coffers.3 Thus begins the tale of expropriations in Cuba. On New
qea'’s rahb G=A=b ZiOeH Cast'o4 declared the triumph of the rev-
oH&tion ftJe 7C&lan 9e%oH&tion5db l&t it jas not &ntiH A*'iH G=@G
1. LEELOCKWOOD, CASTRO’SCUBA: ANAMERICAN JOURNALIST’S INSIDELOOK
ATCUBA 1959N1969, 101 (Nina Weiner ed. 2016). Fidel Castro made this state-
ment in August 1965, remarking on the provenance of his country retreat
house on Isla de Juventud, née Isle of Pines, the second largest Cuban island.
See id. Castro’s comment is telling: in two quick quips, Castro cynically alludes
to various historical facts, including his nationalization of foreign and domestic
private property after the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista’s government, the
bravado with which the nationalizations were performed, and his disdain for
American influence in Cuba. See id.
2. SeeMICHAELW.GORDON, THECUBANNATIONALIZATIONS: THEDEMISE OF
FOREIGN PRIVATE PROPERTY 20N32 (1976). Fulgencio Batista was the elected
President of Cuba from 1940N1944 and dictator from 1952N1959, before being
overthrown by the Cuban Revolution at the hands of Fidel Castro. See id.
3. See CUBA: A COUNTRY STUDY 64 (Rex A. Hudson ed., Federal Research
Division, Library of Congress 4th ed. 2002). See also RICHARD E. FEINBERG,
OPEN FORBUSINESS: BUILDING THENEWCUBANECONOMY 9 (2016); Cuba Marks
50 Years Since ‘Triumphant Revolution,’ NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 1, 2009),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=98937598; Tim
O’Meilia, Widow of Cuban Dictator Batista Dies in West Palm Beach, PALM
BEACH POST (Oct. 4, 2006), reprinted in Dominican Today, http://www.domini-
cantoday.com/dr/world/2006/10/4/18267/Widow-of-Cuban-dictator-Batista-
dies-in-West-Palm-Beach.
4. For an authoritative bibliography of materials unpacking Fidel Castro’s
rebirth as a revolutionary, see generally Rolando E. Bonachea & Nelson P.
Valdes, The Making of a Revolutionary: A Fidel Castro Bibliography (19470
1958), 5 LAT. AM. RES. REV. 83 (1970).
O
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that Castro proclaimed that the Cuban Revolution was social-
ist.5 Any discussion of post-1959 Cuba must first consider the
transition of power from Batista to Castro, as well as the radi-
calization of the Cuban Revolution.6
;ne oM tJe maIo' tJeo'ies aO%anQeO to ei*Hain C&la’s meta`
morphosis into a Marxist-Leninist state is the so-QaHHeO 7laQk`
ja'Oness tJesisb5 jJiQJ MoQ&ses on C&la’s 7*'es&meO eQonomiQ
anO soQiaH laQkja'Oness *'io' to G=A=^57 The backwardness the-
sis is loHste'eO lh a Qo'oHHa'h< 7tJe aHHeLeO ei*Hoitati%e L'i* lh
jJiQJ 4^8^ in%esto's JeHO tJe C&lan eQonomh^58 The incestuous-
ness and extent of American control over Cuba is evidenced by a
few key statistics. By 1958, on the precipice of the Cuban Revo-
H&tionb 7tJe 4niteO 8tates jas *&'QJasinL tjo-thirds of the is-
HanO’s ei*o'ts anO jas s&**HhinL ?\ *e'Qent oM its im*o'ts^59 As
an isHanO nation tJat 7th*iMieO jJat eQonomists Ja%e Qome to QaHH
an 3ei*o't eQonomhobn’510 the impact of American investments in
C&la jas &nmistakalHe^ 6J'o&LJ s*eQiaHigation anO 7eit'eme
inte'Oe*enOenQe5 jitJ mainHh tJe 4niteO 8tates fl&t aHso other
Western nations), Cubans enjoyed a thriving middle class, which
Meat&'eO 7jJat jas *'olalHh tJe JiLJest stanOa'O oM Hi%inL
amonL t'o*iQaH nations^511 But this achievement was marred by
Qont'aOiQtions jitJin C&la’s soQieth anO eQonomhb lo'n o&t oM
7tJe neoQoHoniaHmoOeH im*oseO lh tJe4niteO 8tates^512 The Cu-
ban economy was in essence what many scholars have called a
5. See CUBA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 3, at 64N66. For an analysis of
the Cuban Revolution more sympathetic to Castro and his revolutionaries, see
generally AVIVACHOMSKY, AHISTORY OF THECUBANREVOLUTION (2011). For an
account of why the Cuban Revolution still matters, see generally Eric Selbin,
Conjugating the Cuban Revolution: It Mattered, It Matters, It Will Matter, 36
LAT. AM. PERSPECTIVES 21 (2009).
6. See ERIC N. BAKLANOFF, EXPROPRIATION OF U.S. INVESTMENTS IN CUBA,
MEXICO, AND CHILE 31, n. 1 (1975) (7The historical and mainly political factors
that account for the radicalization of the Cuban revolution are analyzed in two
recommended scholarly works5) (citing THEODORE DRAPER, CASTRO’S
REVOLUTION, MYTHS AND REALITIES (Praeger, 1962) and BORIS GOLDENBERG,
THECUBAN REVOLUTION AND LATINAMERICA (Praeger, 1965)).
7. See id. at 12.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 14.
10. See id. at 13.
11. See id. at 14.
12. See Francisco López Segrera, The Cuban Revolution: Historical Roots,
Current Situation, Scenarios, and Alternatives, 38 LAT. AM. PERSPECTIVES 3, 4
(2011) (7Politically, the expression of this model was the Batista dictatorship;
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7s&l-eQonomh5 oM tJe 4niteO 8tatesb with Batista as a puppet
dictator.13 At tJe Jea't oM Cast'o’s aLenOa jas Q&'inL C&la’s
7laQkja'Oness5 lh o&stinL tJe Ame'iQans anO aQJie%inL 7M&HH in`
dependence from the United States through a socialist revolu-
tion^514
Castro quickly embarked on a nationalization campaign au-
thorized by a series of bills signed swiftly into law, seizing both
foreign and domestic private property.15 Castro conducted the
nationalization process under the guise of the Cuban Revolu-
tion’s *'oQHaimeO soQiaHist %aH&esb a *'oQess tJat jas jitJo&t
(&estion 7one oM tJe most sjee*inL 'eMo'ms oM ojne'sJi* oM tJe
means of production and distribution in history, and certainly
tJe most se'io&s to4niteO 8tates in%esto's^516 Altering property
'eHations e%ent&aHHh leQame Cast'o’s 7main inst'&ment Mo' Qon`
solidating power: the [Cuban] government increasingly monopo-
lized the sources of wealth and income while depriving its poten-
tiaH o**onents oM eQonomiQ 'eso&'Qes^517 Following the fall of Ba-
tista and the symbolic 7triumph5 of the Cuban Revolution over
los Yankees,18 Fidel Castro set about consolidating power by na-
tionalizing the assets of Cuban nationals and non-nationals
alike.19
From 1959 through 1961, the newly installed Cuban govern-
ment expropriated nearly all American-owned assets, which pro-
economically, it was underdevelopment; in the social sphere, it was a rate of
unemployment close to 20 percent and a high level of underemployment; inter-
nationally, it was the absence of an independent foreign policy; and culturally,
it was an increasing crisis of cultural identity threatened by images of the
3American way of life.’5).
13. See BAKLANOFF, supra note 6, at 12N15.
14. See id. at 13.
15. For a detailed account of the Cuban nationalizations, see generally
GORDON, supra note 2.
16. Id. at 108.
17. See RICHARD E. FEINBERG, RECONCILINGU.S. PROPERTY CLAIMS IN CUBA:
TRANSFORMING TRAUMA INTO OPPORTUNITY, LAT. AM. INITIATIVE AT BROOKINGS
1 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Reconciling-
US-Property-Claims-in-Cuba-Feinberg.pdf.
18. Yankee is a derogatory term used to refer to a person who lives in, or is
from, the United States. See Yankee, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/yankee/ (last visited Mar.
22, 2018).
19. See GORDON, supra note 2, at 69N108.
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cess amounted to 7tJe Ha'Lest &nQom*ensateO takinL oM Ame'i`
Qan *'o*e'th lh a Mo'eiLn Lo%e'nment in Jisto'h^520 Expropriated
American assets were primarily comprised of the following as-
sets: improved and unimproved real property, such as agricul-
tural lands, oil refineries, and hotels; infrastructure, including
almost all of the electrical power grid and the entire telephone
system; and liquid and illiquid assets held in bank accounts, in-
surance policies, and various securities.21 A modest estimate of
the present day value of nationalized American assets in Cuba
nears $7 billion USD,22 while the combined value of all expropri-
ated assets exceeds $50 billion USD.23
While there is an abundance of scholarship on the potential for
settling outstanding claims against Cuba for expropriations of
American assets, the recent warming of relations between the
United States and Cuba24 provides a unique and timely lens
through which to analyze these decades-old issues. Three pieces
of scholarship form the bedrock of existing analysis. Creighton
4ni%e'sith’s E\\? 'e*o't ftJe 7C'eiLJton 9e*o't5db M&nOeO in *a't
by the United States Agency for International Development
20. Timothy Ashby, U.S. Certified Claims Against Cuba: Legal Reality and
Likely Settlement Mechanism, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 413, 413N14
(2009).
21. See id.
22. See Leon Neyfakh, Cuba, You Owe Us $7 Billion, BOSTON GLOBE (Apr.
18, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/04/18/cuba-you-owe-bil-
lion/jHAufRfQJ9Bx24TuzQyBNO/story.html.
23. Mari-Claudia Jiménez, The Future: Restituting Looted Cuban Art, 109
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 116, 117 (2015) (7Cuba faces expropriation claims by
many hundreds of thousands of its nationals, both on the island and abroad,
as well as claims by almost six thousand U.S. nationals whose assets in Cuba
were expropriated without compensation during the early years of the Cuban
revolution. The current combined worth of these assets is estimated at more
than $50 billion [USD]. The property seizures range from land, homes, indus-
tries, and businesses to the personal property and art collections of Cuban and
U.S. citizens that were seized before and after they left the island.5) (citing
David Glovin & Toluse Olorunnipa, Cuba Property Claims: Yielding Pennies,
May Spur Talks, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 22, 2014), https://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2014-12-23/cuba-seized-property-claims-seen-as-yield-
ing-pennies-on-dollar).
24. Charting a New Course in Cuba, WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT BARACK
OBAMA, https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cuba (last visited
Jan. 15, 2017) [https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20170116030059/https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-
policy/cuba].
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(USAID),25 argues for a multi-tiered approach, establishing a
pecking order ranging from the largest corporate claims to the
smaHHest inOi%iO&aH QHaimsb to le settHeO lh eitJe' a 7C&la-U.S.
CHaims 6'il&naH5 o' a 7C&lan 8*eQiaH CHaims Co&'t^526 Timothy
AsJlh’s27 E\\= a'tiQHe ftJe 7AsJlh :'o*osaH5d in tJe 4ni%e'sith
of Miami Inter-Ame'iQan Taj 'e%iej s&LLests tJat 78*eQiaH 8it`
&ations Z&nOs5 jo&HO le lette' *oiseO to QonM'ont tJe *oHitiQaH
and legal quagmire, whereby claim holders would sell their
claims to an international fund (that specializes in distressed
debt) that would, in turn, settle the claims on a large scale
level.28 9iQJa'O Zeinle'L’s29 2015 Brookings policy paper (the
7Zeinle'L :'o*osaH5d MinOs tJat a tjo-tiered approach may be
more realistic, allowing for the primary settlement of large cor-
porate claims (through development incentives, tax credits, and
25. Mission, Vision and Values, USAID, https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-
are/mission-vision-values (last visited Nov. 13, 2016). Founded by President
John F. Kennedy, USAID is a U.S. government agency responsible for admin-
istering civilian foreign aid; its mission is to 7end extreme poverty and promote
resilient, democratic societies while advancing [the United States’] security
and prosperity.5 Id.
26. CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW & DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE, REPORT ON THE RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING PROPERTY CLAIMS
BETWEEN CUBA & THE UNITED STATES (2007) [hereinafter CREIGHTON
UNIVERSITY]. The authors note that the 7views expressed in this Report are
those of the investigators, not USAID nor the U.S. Government.5 See id. at 2.
27. Timothy F. Ashby, DENTONS, http://www.dentons.com/en/timothy-ashby
(last visited Jan. 8, 2017). Timothy Ashby is Senior Counsel to the global law
firm Dentons. Id. The London-based attorney holds a JD from Seattle Univer-
sity Law School, a PhD in International Relations from the University of
Southern California, and an MBA from the University of Edinburgh, Scotland.
Id.
28. See Ashby, supra note 20, at 428N31.
29. Richard E. Feinberg, Experts, BROOKINGS, https://www.brook-
ings.edu/experts/richard-feinberg/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2017). Richard E. Fein-
berg is a 7nonresident senior fellow in the Latin America Initiative at Brook-
ings[,]5 as well as a 7professor of international political economy in the School
of Global Policy and Strategy . . . at the University of California, San Diego.5
Id. Feinberg previously served as 7special assistant to President Clinton for
National Security Affairs and senior director of the National Security Council’s
. . . Office of Inter-American Affairs.5 Id. Feinberg has also served as President
of the Inter-American Dialogue (another center for policy analysis) and Exec-
utive Vice President of the Overseas Development Council, and he has held
various positions with the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Treasury
Department. Id. Feinberg is also a 7book reviewer for the Western Hemisphere
section of Foreign Affairs magazine.5 Id.
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other business incentives) and the potential for modest second-
ary settlements (cash and bonds) paid to smaller claim-holders,
whether corporate or individual.30
While these proposals are noteworthy and undoubtedly well-
developed, they collectively and largely ignore the Cuban gov-
e'nment’s ojn QHaims aLainst tJe4niteO 8tates^ C&lan Zo'eiLn
Minister Bruno Rodríguez has outlined the following four areas
of interest, which must be resolved before Cuba will seriously
consider moving forward with the normalization of relations: the
7totaH HiMtinL5 oM tJe 4niteO 8tates emla'Lo aLainst C&la ftJe
7[mla'Lo5db tJe 'et&'n oM tJe 7iHHeLaHHh oQQ&*ieO te''ito'h oM
Guantanamob5 7M&HH 'es*eQt Mo' tJe C&lan so%e'eiLnthb5 anO Qom`
pensation for both human and economic damages.31 The latter
issue of damages includes personal injuries sustained by Cuban
nationals (following U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
sponsored hostilities in Cuba and the Bay of Pigs invasion) and,
on a purely economic level, $121 billion USD worth of accumu-
lated damages stemming from the Embargo.32
Because the purported value of Cuban claims far exceeds the
stated value of American claims, many Cuban officials have ar-
gued that claimants from both nations sJo&HO sim*Hh 7QaHH it a
jasJ5 lh OeO&QtinL tJe totaH %aH&e oM 4^8^ QHaims M'om tJe Qom`
bined value of all Cuban counterclaims.33 One senior Cuban dip-
lomat succinctly expressed this reductionist solution, stating
tJat 73otnJe Qom*ensation iss&e Qo&HO le OeQiOeO easiHh anO
quickly: simply offset U.S. claims with Cuban counter-claims! Or
eHse tJe iss&e Qan O'aL on Mo' hea's^ ^ ^ ^’534 The obvious flaw in
this proposed means of settlement is that it is politically and dip-
HomatiQaHHh &ntenalHeb as e%e'h C&lan oMMiQiaH knojs 7tJat tJe
United States is never going to discuss such counter-QHaimsobn535
30. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 25N34, 35.
31. See id. at 13 (citing Press Availability with Cuban Foreign Minister
Bruno Rodriguez, U.S. DEP’T STATE (July 20, 2015), https://www.state.gov/sec-
retary/remarks/2015/07/245094.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2017)
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170116033000/https://www.state.gov/secre-
tary/remarks/2015/07/245094.htm]).
32. See id. at 13N14.
33. See id. at 12 (citing Author conversation with Cuban diplomat, June
2015).
34. See id.
35. Lars Schoultz, Blessings of Liberty: The United States and the Promotion
of Democracy in Cuba, 34 J. LAT. AM. STUD. 397, 421 (2002).
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'eO&QinL tJe C&lan Oi*Homat’s a'L&ment to me'e Oi*HomatiQ
posturing.
Americans, in particular members of the Cuban Ame'iQan 7ei`
iHe5 Qomm&nithb36 do not recognize Cuban claims as legitimate,
but are nevertheless intent on pursuing their own claims against
Cuba.37 6Jis sentimentb MoQ&sinL on tJe *e'Qei%eO 7loL&sness5 oM
Cuban claims, was recently expressed in an open letter from
Senator Marco Rubio to President Barack Obama. In his letter,
Senator Rubio urges President Obama to place a higher priority
on 7oltaininL Qom*ensation Mo' tJe *'o*e'th stoHen M'om Ame'i`
Qansobn5 anO to see C&lan QHaims Mo' jJat Je anO most Ame'i`
cans perceive them to be: 7'iOiQ&Ho&s eMMo'ts lh tJe Cast'o 'eLime
to manufacture counter claims against the U.S. government to
a%oiO makinL Ame'iQans jJoHe aLain^538 But if the United
8tates is t'&Hh intent on 7QJa'tinL a nej Qo&'se in C&la5 fas Oe`
clared by the Obama Administration),39 Cuban claims against
the United States must form a central part of settlement negoti-
ations.
To date, most of the proposals and frameworks set forth by
scholars and academics revolve around settling only U.S. nation-
aHs’ QHaims against Cuba, an approach that lacks grounding in
the legacy and dynamics of the Cuban Revolution. While some
sQJoHa's Ja%e noteO tJat 7o'ne%oH&tiona'h *'o*aLanOa Qan stiHH
be found in Cuba, nearly 50 years after tJe 'e%oH&tionobn540 as late
as 1999, Fidel Castro proclaimed the Cuban Revolution had not
yet started,41 a view reflected in the political consciousness of
36. See CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 4. Cuban Americans form
a politically and economically empowered lobby with enclaves in South Florida,
New Jersey, New York, and elsewhere across the United States. See id. See
also discussion infra note 245.
37. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 5.
38. Letter from Marco Rubio, United States Senator from Florida, to Presi-
dent Barack Obama (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.rubio.senate.gov/pub-
lic/_cache/files/b285f024-1102-4458-b1cb-
7dc46ad158bb/66B5EF39DA8672E3E9D855BCAFC03199.10-12-16-letter-to-
obama—-castro-confiscation.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2017) [https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20170116040056/http://www.rubio.senate.gov/pub-
lic/_cache/files/b285f024-1102-4458-b1cb-
7dc46ad158bb/66B5EF39DA8672E3E9D855BCAFC03199.10-12-16-letter-to-
obama—-castro-confiscation.pdf].
39. See Charting a New Course in Cuba, supra note 24.
40. See CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 12 (emphasis added).
41. JOAQUÍN ROY, CUBA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE HELMS-BURTON
DOCTRINE 182 (2000).
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many Cubans. Outstanding Cuban claims must be taken seri-
ously, since s&mma'iHh OismissinL tJese QHaims as 7M'i%oHo&s5 o'
7&ns&lstantiateO5 fas 8enato' 9&lio anO manh otJe's Ja%e na`
ively done) will lead to a breakdown of negotiations and rela-
tions. In order to bridge the divide, all parties must have a seat
at the table.
Part I of this Note will unpack the historical underpinnings,
as well as the consequences, of the expropriation of foreign and
domestic private property in Cuba. Part II will explore the vari-
ous avenues of claims resolution proposed, pursued, and
achieved to date. First, there will be an analysis of the three ma-
jor American proposals discussed in this Note: the Creighton Re-
port, the Ashby Proposal, and the Feinberg Proposal. Next, it
will provide an overview of the Cuban position on outstanding
American and Cuban American claims, as well as the various
official (and unofficial) proposals that have come out of Cuba to
date. Additionally, it will examine five claims resolution settle-
ments that Cuba has reached with countries other than the
United States, including Switzerland, Spain, France, Great Brit-
ain, and Canada. Part III will set forth an inclusive proposal for
settling the claims of three distinct groups: U.S. nationals, Cu-
ban American exiles (resident in the United States and abroad),
and Cuban nationals (still in Cuba). Claims will be resolved
through the following three-tier framework of settlement mech-
anisms, including: restitution of nationalized American and Cu-
ban American exile assets in Cuba, including improved and un-
improved real property; bilateral trade agreements, including
development rights and tax incentives; and direct compensation,
including partial interest payments.
I. A BRIEFWALK THROUGHHISTORY
Although the Spanish-American War freed Cuba from colonial
rule, the fist of the Spaniards was replaced by decades of direct
and indirect investment and intervention by the United States.42
In the years preceding the Cuban Revolution, Cuba became the
playground of the wealthiest and most famous (or often notori-
ous) Americans.43 From the lens of popular Americana, Cuban
42. See CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 12.
43. Samuel Farber, Cuba Before the Revolution, JACOBIN (Sept. 6, 2015),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/09/cuban-revolution-fidel-castro-casinos-
batista. See also FEINBERG, supra note 3, at 8N9 (7In the 1950s Cuba was a
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soQieth jas one 7Qons&meO lh tJe illnesses of gambling, the Ma-
Miab anO *'ostit&tion^544
Even prominent American intellectuals conceived of Cuba in
this fashion. Susan Sontag45 OesQ'ileO C&la as 7a Qo&nt'h
known mainly for dance, music, prostitutes, cigars, abortions,
resort life, and pornoL'a*JiQmo%iesobn5 jJiHe A'tJ&' SiHHe'46 de-
sQ'ileO C&lan soQieth as 7Jo*eHessHh Qo''&*tb a SaMia *Hah`
L'o&nOb a lo'OeHHo Mo' Ame'iQans anO otJe' Mo'eiLne's^547 As
writer Samuel Farber points out, perhaps mainstream Amer-
iQa’s *e'Qe*tion oM C&la 'e%eaHeO mo'e alo&t 7tJe Ro'tJ Ame'i`
Qan QoHoniaH jo'HO%iej tJan anhtJinL alo&t C&la itseHMb548 as
many of the illicit features associated with then-Cuba predomi-
nate in the modern American pop-consciousness.
Still, casino gambling, the Italian-American Mafia, and pros-
titution were undeniable features of pre-Castro Cuban land-
scape.49 As early as the 1920s, casinos began to develop along
jitJ tJe to&'ist inO&st'hb anO lh tJe G=A\sb manh oM Xa%ana’s
top hotels were home to bustling casinos, including the Riviera,
the Capri, and the Havana Hilton.50 Both the Batista regime and
the several resident Mafia families profited immensely from
popular playground for American tourists seeking escape from the northern
winters. Overnight railroad sleeping cars combined with steamships crossing
the Florida StraitsNand increasingly, regular airplane serviceNbrought Ha-
vana nightlife and Varadero beaches easily within reach. The island was all
the more comfortable for the presence of many brand-name U.S. corporations
that supplied the nation’s electricity and banking services and owned much of
the industry and agriculture. Many leading hotels were also familiar to U.S.
visitors; some of the hotel owners were infamous mafia capos such as Myer
Lansky and Santo Trafficante Jr. (the [American crime film] The Godfather
[Part II] . . . famously fictionalized a mob conclave in Havana on the eve of the
1959 revolution). Celebrities of the day, such as swimmer Esther Williams and
Senator John F. Kennedy, and a regular stream of performing artists, includ-
ing Ginger Rogers, Eartha Kitt, and Frank Sinatra, filled in the scene.5).
44. Farber, supra note 43.
45. Susan Sontag, SUSAN SONTAG FOUND., http://www.susansontag.com/Su-
sanSontag/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). Susan Sontag was a cele-
brated American writer, filmmaker, and human rights activist. Id.
46. ARTHUR MILLER FOUND., http://www.arthurmiller.org/ (last visited Jan.
15, 2017). Arthur Miller was an American playwright, essayist, and fixture in
the twentieth-century American theatre scene. Id.
47. Farber, supra note 43.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
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7skimminL tJe Qasinos’ *'oQeeOsb QJeatinL in%esto'sb anO t'aM`
MiQkinL O'&Ls^551 Female sex workers kept these machos com-
pany, highlighting the irony of the sexual double standard—the
most Qo%eteO 7OeQent5 Li'Hs je'e %i'Lins &ntiH ma''iaLeb jJiHe
men were free to be as promiscuous as they pleased.52 Mean-
jJiHeb tJe 7L'eat maIo'ith oM C&lans saj Qasinos ^ ^ ^ as oOio&s
expressions of the corruption of Batista anO Jis JenQJmen^553
Even sob tJe QomlineO eQonomiQ im*aQt oM to&'ism jas 7L'eatHh
eiaLLe'ateO5 in tJe4niteO 8tatesb as tJe eQonomiQ seQto' ea'neO
onHh .D\ miHHion 48r M'om to&'ism in G=A@ f7la'eHh G\ *e'Qent
oM jJat tJe s&La' inO&st'h maOe tJat hea'5), an industry in
which casinos and prostitution played a key role.54
!&t C&la jas m&QJ mo'e tJan I&st Ame'iQa’s *HahL'o&nO^
While the combined economic impact of tourism was $30 million
48r in G=A@b C&la’s s&La' inO&st'h ea'neO .D\\ miHHion 48r
that same year.55 Caña de azúcar (sugar cane), not gambling and
prostitution, was the real driver of the Cuban economy, among
other industries. By the time Fidel Castro came to power, U.S.
nationals,56 not Cubans, owned and controlled the majority of
tJe isHanO nation’s assets, including approximately 80 percent of
the sugar lands and 90 percent of all electricity generated in
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (7This relatively modest performance was due in part to the fact that
mass international tourism facilitated by widespread commercial jet travel had
not yet begun.5).
55. Id.
56. See International Claims Settlement Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1643 et seq. (1949).
As defined by Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act (ICSA) of
1949, a 7national of the United States5 means:
(A) a natural person who is a citizen of the United States, or
(B) a corporation or other legal entity which is organized un-
der the laws of the United States, or any State, the District
of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, if natural
persons who are citizens of the United States own, directly or
indirectly, 50 per centum or more of the outstanding stock or
other beneficial interest of such corporation or entity. The
term does not include aliens.
Id.
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Cuba, along with most of the mining industry, oil refineries, bot-
tling plants, and warehouses.57Americans also owned hotels and
other commercial properties, private properties, and liquid and
illiquid assets, including bank accounts, insurance policies, and
securities.58 In total, U.S. nationals owned and controlled about
two-thirds of the Cuban economy.59
WM tJe C&lan 9e%oH&tion jas lo'n o&t oM 7Oisgust with govern-
ment eiQesses5 &nOe' !atistab60 its fires were fanned by a deep
distrust of American profiteers and burgeoning globalization.61
The nationalization of American assets was perhaps the greatest
rebuke Castro could offer. When Castro took power in 1959, the
nej C&lan Lo%e'nment 7inJe'iteO a .A\ miHHion o48rn l&OLet
OeMiQit *H&s a .G^B liHHion o48rn nationaH Oelt^562 To add insult
to injury, Batista had allegedly absconded with an estimated
$200 million USD from the Cuban national treasury.63 Castro
swiftly embarked on a nationalization campaign designed to
7Qo''eQt5 tJe sit&ation^64
Beginning on February 13, 1959, Castro passed a series of laws
to 'et&'n 7stoHen5 *'o*e'ties to tJei' 'iLJtM&H ojne's^65 Among
the first properties to be nationalizeO je'e tJose 7leHonLinL to
Mo'me' QoHHalo'ato's oM !atista^566 Next, Castro passed the first
of two key laws enabling the expropriations. The 1959 Agrarian
57. See Ashby, supra note 20, at 413N14.
58. See id. at 414.
59. See id.
60. Farber, supra note 43.
61. See LOCKWOOD, supra note 1, at 140N44. Speaking to American journal-
ist Lee Lockwood in 1965, Fidel Castro recalled how the 7United Fruit Com-
pany[,]5 an American-owned and controlled business, 7[had] owned some 325
thousand acres of land. Its stockholders lived in the United States and received
a profit there, an income, without ever having visited those lands. . . . The
North American company was in constant social conflict with the workers. . .
.5 Id.
62. See Ashby, supra note 20, at 414, n.6 (citing MICHAEL W. GORDON, THE
CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF FOREIGN PRIVATE PROPERTY 101
(1976)).
63. See id.
64. See GORDON, supra note 2, at 70N72.
65. See id. at 72 (citing Ley No. 78, Feb. 19, 1959, GACETAOFICIAL, Feb. 19,
1959 (Cuba); Ley No. 112, Feb. 27, 1959, GACETAOFICIAL, Mar. 4, 1959 (Cuba);
Ley 151, Mar. 17, 1959, GACETA OFICIAL, Mar. 18, 1959 (Cuba); Ley 438, July
7, 1959, GACETAOFICIAL, July 13, 1959 (Cuba); Ley 545, Sept. 2, 1959, GACETA
OFICIAL, Sept. 10, 1959).
66. See id.
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9eMo'm Taj jas 7Mi'st *'om&HLateO in Sah l&t amenOeO anO
MinaHigeO in V&ne^567As early as 1953, in his Mamo&s 7Xisto'hWiHH
AlsoH%e Se5 s*eeQJb Cast'o OeQHa'eO tJat HanO 'eOist'il&tion
was an essential component of the Cuban Revolutionary agenda,
and the Agrarian Reform Law was the first stop on this path.68
The second key law—Law 851, which expressly targeted proper-
ties and assets then-owned by U.S. nationals—was not passed
until summer of 1960.69 Law 851 granted the Cuban government
the authority to nationalize American-owned properties and as-
sets 73jJen tJeh QonsiOe' it Qon%enient Mo' tJe OeMense oM tJe na-
tionaH inte'est^’570 The Cuban government also expropriated sim-
67. Id. at 75 (citing Ley de Reforma Agraria, May 17, 1959, 7 LEYES DEL
GOBIERNO PROVISIONAL DE LA REVOLUCÍON 135 (1959); REVOLUCÍON, May 18,
1959; Decreto No. 1426, May 17, 1959, GACETA OFICIAL (EDICÍON
EXTRAORDINARIA), June 4, 1959).
68. See id. at 76, n.31 (7Castro has stated in his defense: The Second Revo-
lutionary Law would have granted property to all planters, subplanters, les-
sees, partners, and squatters who hold parcels of five or less caballerías of land,
and the state would indemnify the former owners on the basis of the rental
they would have received on these parcels over a period of ten years.5) (citing
La Historia Me Absolvera, EL PENSAMIENTO DE FIDEL CASTRO 21 (1963)). The
Cuban government also passed the Urban Housing Reform Law of October 14,
1960, whereby property rights were transferred from owners to tenants.). See
FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 1. Under Article 21 of the Reform Law, 7landlords
who remained in Cuba were compensated with life-long pensions[,]5 while the
residences of those who fled, i.e., Cuban exiles, were summarily 7declared
3abandoned’ and redistributed to regime constituents.5 Id. See also discussion
infra note 245.
69. See GORDON, supra note 2, at 98 (citing Ley 851, July 6, 1960, GACETA
OFICIAL, July 7, 1960).
70. See id. at 98. Some scholars view Law 851 as, at least in part, Castro’s
response to two American actions: first, the United States Congress passing an
amendment to the Sugar Act of 1948 (giving the President discretionary au-
thority to establish the Cuban sugar quota 7at any figure5); and second, Presi-
dent Eisenhower exercising that authority to reduce the quota arrangement
from 739,752 tons to 39,752 tons, 7a potential loss of some $92,500,000 [USD],
and a probable permanent loss to Cuba of that portion of the price which rep-
resented the subsidy, since it was not expected that other purchasers would
pay the subsidized price offered by the United States.5 See id. at 97N99. This
sequence of events was a 7clear indication5 that President Eisenhower had de-
clared 7economic war,5 and Law 851 allowed Castro to, at least temporarily,
resolve the issue. See id. at 98N99. The American-owned sugar mills expropri-
ated pursuant to Law 851 were valued 7at up to $260 million [USD,]5 leaving
Cuba with a windfall of $167.5 million USD, at least for that year (1960). See
id. at 97N98.
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ilar assets of U.S. allies during the 1960s, including the nation-
als of Switzerland, Spain, France, Great Britain, and Canada.71
Castro passed Laws 890 and 891, which together nationalized
382 major companies, all but two Canadian banks, and proper-
ties and assets owned by foreigners and Cuban nationals alike.72
By seizing foreign and domestic assets, Castro shifted the bal-
anQe oM *oje'b 7t'ansMo'meO5 tJe isHanO nation’s inte'nationaH
relations, anO 7O'amatiQaHHh 'eO&QoeOn tJe inMH&enQe oM tJe
4niteO 8tates5 in one MeHH sjoo*^73
Ironically, the initial U.S. response to expropriation of its na-
tionaHs’ aL'iQ&Ht&'aH JoHOinLs jas mostHh *ositi%e^74 American
optimism was tempered by the proviso that the United States
ei*eQteO 73*'om*tb aOe(&ate anO eMMeQti%e Qom*ensation^’575 One
Ame'iQan Oi*Homat ei*'esseO 73se'io&s QonQe'n’ 'eLa'OinL 3tJe
adequacy of the provision for compensation to its citizens whose
*'o*e'thmah le ei*'o*'iateO^’576 The Cuban government swiftly
71. See Ashby, supra note 20, at 421N22. See also Neyfakh, supra note 22;
and FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 11 (7Cuba has already negotiated bilateral
settlements of outstanding property claims with other governments, including
Canada (1980), Great Britain (1978), France (1967), Spain (1967), and Swit-
zerland (1967).5).
72. See GORDON, supra note 2, at 103, n.110 (stating that the purpose of
these laws was to 7transfer control of basic industry to the Cuban government
and [to] 3liquidat[e] the economic power of the privileged classes.’5) (citing Ley
890, Oct. 13, 1960, GACETA OFICIAL (EDICION EXTRAORDINARIA), Oct. 13, 1960;
and Ley 891, Oct. 13, 1960, GACETA OFICIAL (EDICION EXTRAORDINARIA), Oct.
13, 1960).
73. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 2.
74. See Ashby, supra note 20, at 414. For example, U.S. Ambassador Philip
Bonsal delivered a diplomatic note in June 1959:
o9neQoLniginL 3tJat &nOe' inte'nationaH Haj a state Jas tJe
right to take property within its jurisdiction for public pur-
poses in the absence of treaty provisions or other agreements
to tJe Qont'a'hb’ anO stateO tJat tJe 4niteO 8tates 3&nOe'`
stanOs anO is shm*atJetiQ to tJe olIeQti%es’ oM tJe HanO 'eMo'm
*'oL'am leQa&se it 3Qan Qont'il&te to a JiLJer standard of
Hi%inLb *oHitiQaH staliHith anO soQiaH *'oL'ess^’
See id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Informs Cuba of Views on Agrarian
Reform Law, 40 DEP’T ST. BULL. 958 (1959)).
75. Id. at 414.
76. Id. Law 851 7authorized compensation for property takings of U.S. na-
tionals in the form of thirty-year government bonds with an annual interest
rate of 2%. For real property, Cuban law allowed for compensation to include
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responded, recognizing its obligation and declaring its intent to
*'o%iOe 7*'om*t anO aOe(&ate Qom*ensation^577 But the Cuban
government qualified its message with the caveat that the
United States’ receipt of any monies owed for said compensation
could be delayed, and the payment scheme modified, because of
73tJe QJaotiQ eQonomiQ anO MinanQiaH sit&ation into jJiQJ tJe
overthrown tyranny plunged the country and the marked imbal-
ance in the balance of payments between the United States and
C&la^’578 Thenb MoHHojinL tJe 7seQonO ja%e oM Mo'eiLn asset na`
tionaHigationsb5 tJe C&lan Lo%e'nment 'eminOeO its Ame'iQan
Q'eOito's tJat 7it jas too *oo' to *ah Qom*ensation *'om*tHh o'
in cash, reinforcing their intent to primarily use bonds for set-
tHement^579
From 19A= tJ'o&LJ G=@Gb 7oanH'eaOh M'aheO ties letjeenWasJ`
inLton anOXa%ana5 Qontin&eO tojea'b as tJe4niteO 8tates 'e*`
rimanded the Cuban government over its seizure of American
*'o*e'th anO tJe eieQ&tions oM %a'io&s oMMiQiaHs M'om !atista’s
former regime.80 Fidel Castro threatened to expel American dip-
Homats 'esiOent in C&la Mo' 7meOOHinL in C&lan aMMai's^581 Even-
tually, American patience wore thin (indeed, U.S. nationals are
still waiting to be compensated). In 1961, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower declared the cessation of diplomatic relations, stat-
inLb 7otnJe'e is a Himit to jJat tJe 4niteO 8tates in seHM-respect
Qan enO&'e^ 6Jat Himit Jas noj leen 'eaQJeO^582
One year later, on February 3, 1962, President Kennedy
signed Proclamation 3447, formally establishing El BloqueoNthe
a 15% profit and actual expenses in addition to the base value for vacant resi-
dential lots, and a 12% profit for lots suitable for commercial use.5 See id. at
415 (citing Ley 851, July 6, 1960, GACETA OFICIAL, July 7, 1960; and Ley 218,
Apr. 7, 1959, GACETAOFICIAL, Apr. 13, 1959).
77. See GORDON, supra note 2, at 128.
78. See id. at 128N29 (quoting Cuban Note of June 15, 1959, cited in Rafat,
Legal Aspects of the Cuban Expropriation of American-Owned Property, 11 ST.
LOUIS L. J. 45, 58 (1966)).
79. See Ashby, supra note 20, at 415 (citing MICHAEL W. GORDON, THE
CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF FOREIGN PRIVATE PROPERTY 101
(1976)).
80. Patrick Oppmann, U.S., Cuba Re-Establish Diplomatic Relations, Reo-
pen Embassies, CNN (July 20, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/07/20/poli-
tics/cuba-u-s-embassies-opening/.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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derogatory Cuban term for the Embargo.83 In 1964, the Ameri-
can government also established the Cuban Claims Program,
which authorized the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
(FCSC)84 to gather information regarding claims against the Cu-
ban government for nationalized assets.85 The certification pro-
83. Proclamation No. 3447, 76 Stat. 1446 (Feb. 3, 1962),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-76/pdf/STATUTE-76-Pg1446.pdf
(last visited Jan. 16, 2017). Proclamation 3447 signaled the most severe esca-
lation of the previously announced trade embargo, prohibiting the 7importation
into the United States of all goods of Cuban origin and all goods imported from
or through Cuba[,]5 authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury 7to carry out
such prohibition,5 and authorizing the Secretary of Commerce . . . to continue
to carry out the prohibition of all exports from the United States to Cuba. . . .5
Id. Ironically, the United States had publicly announced an arms embargo as
early as March 1958, aimed at depriving Batista, not Castro, of shipments of
weapons and munitions. See CUBA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 3, at 63.
Then, on October 19, 1960, the United States declared 7an embargo on trade
with Cuba, except for medical supplies and most foodstuffs.5 See id. at xxvi.
84. See About the Commission, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of
the U.S., U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/about-commission (last
visited Jan. 16, 2017) [https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20170116205253/https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/about-commis-
sion] (7The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States
(FCSC) is a quasi-judicial, independent agency within the Department of Jus-
tice which adjudicates claims of U.S. nationals against foreign governments,
under specific jurisdiction conferred by Congress, pursuant to international
claims settlement agreements, or at the request of the Secretary of State.
Funds for payment of the Commission’s awards are derived from congressional
appropriations, international claims settlements, or liquidation of foreign as-
sets in the United States by the Departments of Justice and the Treasury.5).
Id.
85. See Ashby, supra note 20, at 417. More specifically, Title V of the ICSA
authorized the FCSC to:
[C]onsider claims of nationals of the United States against
the Government of Cuba, based upon: (1) losses resulting
from the nationalization, expropriation, intervention, or
other taking of, or special measures directed against, prop-
erty by that government; and (2) the disability or death of
nationals of the United States resulting from actions taken
by or under the authority of that government. The program
covered claims for losses which occurred on or after January
1, 1959, when the Castro regime took power. Ordinarily, the
Commission would have held that its jurisdiction extended
only to claims arising before October 16, 1964, the date the
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cess was conducted ex parte, with the FCSC reviewing and eval-
&atinL QHaimants’ OoQ&mentation to asQe'tain tJe %aHiOith anO
amounts of property claims eligible for certification.86 All told,
the FCSC certified 5,911 out of 8,816 claims filed with a total
value of approximately $1.82 billion USD.87 Applying the simple
interest rate of 6 percent recommended by the FCSC, the current
value of outstanding claims approaches $7 billion USD.88
While the U.S. government, egged on by a recalcitrant Cuban
American community, was (and remains) unwilling to accept
Cast'o’s settHement te'msb otJe' nationsb inQH&OinL CanaOab
France, Spain, and Switzerland, opted to settle their outstand-
ing property claims in large, lump-sum amounts.89 Cited as sup-
*o't Mo' tJe 4niteO 8tates’ to&LJ *ositionb tJe Mo'eiLn settHe`
ments were a mere pittance compared to the original value of
program was authorized. In this case, however, the Commis-
sion reasoned that, because the statute was remedial, and be-
cause it had as one of its main purposes the collection, exam-
ination and preparation of evidence and information relating
to the claims while it was still fresh and available, it would
adjudicate any otherwise valid claim even if it arose after the
filing deadline of January 1, 1967. When the program was
authorized, there were no funds available with which tomake
payment on tJe QHaimsb anO tJe stat&te *'eQH&OeO ConL'ess’
appropriation of funds for such payments. As was the case
with the First China Program, the statute provided only for
the determination of the validity and amounts of such claims,
and for the certification oM tJe Commission’s MinOinLs to tJe
Secretary of State for use in the future negotiation of a claims
settlement agreement with the Government of Cuba. The Cu-
ban Claims Program was completed on July 6, 1972. The
Commission adjudicated a total of 8,816 claims in the pro-
gram, of which it found 5,911 to be compensable. The adjudi-
cated total principal value of those claims was
$1,851,057,358.00 [USD].
Completed Programs—Cuba, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the
U.S., U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/claims-against-cuba (last
visited Jan. 16, 2017) [https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20170116205902/https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/claims-against-
cuba].
86. See Ashby, supra note 20, at 417. See also Completed Programs—Cuba,
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the U.S., supra note 85.
87. See Ashby, supra note 20, at 417.
88. See id. See also Neyfakh, supra note 22.
89. See CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 3. See also infra Part II.
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tJe QHaims^ Zo' eiam*Heb 78*anisJ QHaims je'e %aH&eO at .DA\
million [USD] but were ultimately settled for about $40 million
[USD] in 1994, nearly thirty years after nationalization took
*HaQe^590 CanaOa settHeO its QHaims in one 7Lo%e'nment-to-gov-
e'nment H&m* s&m aL'eement in G=>\b5 jo'tJ onHh CAr
.>?Ab\\\ anO 7*aoiOn lh QJeQk in instaHHments o%e' se%e'aH
yea's^591 These settlements, however, were more than a token
gesture. They were the first step towards reconciliation and forg-
ing a path towards renewed diplomatic, political, social, and eco-
nomic ties, a feat the United States has been unable to achieve
despite the change in tone announced by the Obama Administra-
tion.92
Still, the Obama Administration has put forth more than rhet-
oric.93 December 17, 2014 marked dual announcements by Pres-
iOents !a'aQk ;lama anO 9aFH Cast'o oM 7intentions to 'enej
diplomatic relations—Mi'st s&s*enOeO in Van&a'h G=@G^ ^ ^ ^594
Less than one year later, on July 20, 2015, the United States and
C&la 7'eo*eneO emlassies in eaQJ otJe'’s Qa*itaHs^595 In addi-
tionb tJe tjo Lo%e'nments OeQiOeO to estalHisJ a 7liHate'aH Qom`
mission QJa'LeO jitJ aOO'essinL a n&mle' oM %itaH iss&esb5 in`
cluding the outstanding claims of U.S. nationals.96
The obstacles to full restoration of relations loom large, not
least of which is the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
AQt oM G==@ ftJe 7Tile'taO AQt5 o' tJe 7XeHms-!&'ton AQt5db97
90. See Ashby, supra note 20, at 421N22.
91. See id. at 422.
92. See Charting a New Course in Cuba, supra note 24.
93. See id.
94. FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 3.
95. Id.; see also Oppmann, supra note 80.
96. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 3.
97. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22
U.S.C. §§ 6021N91 (1996), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanc-
tions/Documents/libertad.pdf. [https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20170116213644/https://www.treasury.gov/resource-cen-
ter/sanctions/Documents/libertad.pdf]. For an authoritative and in-depth dis-
cussion of the Helms-Burton Act, which codified the Embargo, see generally
ROY, supra note 41. It bears mentioning that in February 1996, 7a Cuban air
force MiG-29 shot down two civilian planes sponsored by theMiami-based exile
group Brothers to the Rescue near Cuba,5 creating an uproar within the Cuban
American exile community resident in the United States. David Rieff, Cuba
Refrozen, 75 FOREIGN AFF. 62, 62 (1996). At least one scholar has cynically
noted that the Helms-Burton Act was passed by Congress and signed by Pres-
ident Clinton that same year (an election year), suggesting that the 7important
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jJiQJ *'eOiQates tJe 7satisMaQto'h 'esoH&tion oM *'o*e'th QHaims
by the Cuban Government . . . as an essential condition for the
full resumption of economic and diplomatic relations between
tJe 4niteO 8tates anO C&la^598 Further, while the Cuban Gov-
e'nment Jas ne%e' 7'e*&OiateO5 tJe 4^8^ QHaimsb 7it Jas Qonsist`
ently stated that it does not recognize the property claims of Cu-
ban exiles in the UniteO 8tates^599 If the United States is truly
intent on 7QJa'tinL a nej Qo&'se in C&la5 as tJe ;lama Admin-
istration has promised,100 it will have to get out the silk gloves,
as there aremany competing interests at stake, any one of which
could foil even the most agreeable of settlement proposals at any
given moment.101 This does not mean, however, that a negative
swing vote5 of Cuban Americans in New Jersey played a greater role in getting
the law passed than any of its underlying merits. Id. Another scholar alleges
the 7hypocrisy5 of the Helms-Burton Act, noting that while the United States
7claims that it has instituted a policy of tightening the economic noose around
Cuba with the Helms-Burton bill on the grounds that Cuba refuses to compen-
sate [U.S. nationals,] . . . [t]his is patently untrue, as Cuba not only successfully
negotiated compensation agreements with other countries, but has and is
ready to negotiate with the US.5 S.J. Noumoff, The Hypocrisy of Helms-Burton:
The History of Cuban Compensation, 33 ECON. POL. WKLY. 955, 955 (1998). See
also infra Part III.
98. See CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 3.
99. See Ashby, supra note 20, at 418 (citing Ley de Reafirmación de la Dign-
idad y Soberanía (Ley 80), 24 Dec. 1996 (Cuba), 36 I.L.M. 472 (1997)).
100. See Charting a New Course in Cuba, supra note 24.
101. The three main groups jockeying for position include U.S. nationals, Cu-
ban American exiles, and Cuban nationals. See supra Introduction. William M.
LeoGrande has attempted to explain U.S.-Cuba policy utilizing Robert D. Put-
nam’s 1988 theory or 7metaphor5 of international bargaining as a two-level
game (the 7Putnam Theory5). SeeWilliam M. LeoGrande, From Havana to Mi-
ami: U.S. Cuba Policy as a Two-Level Game, 40 J. INTER-AM. STUD.WORLDAFF.
67 (1998). The Putnam Theory posits that in any international bargaining sit-
uation, national leaders are involved in two, simultaneous negotiations. Id. at
67. At level one, a 7leader seeks to reach agreement with other international
actors5 (the international negotiation); at level two, that same 7leader must
persuade his domestic constituency to accept (3ratify’)5 the level one agreement
(the domestic negotiation). Id. Rational moves at level one 7may prove impoli-
tic5 at level two, or vice versa, and the leader must perform a series of complex
negotiations to 7win,5 locating the intersection between the level one 7win-set5
and the level two 7win-set.5 Id. According to LeoGrande, 7Putnam’s contribu-
tion lies in his emphasis on the interactive nature of the international and do-
mestic processes.5 Id. LeoGrande assesses that from 1959 through 1974, U.S.-
Cuba relations 7were dominated by Washington’s level [one] security issues.5
Id. at 82. Then, from 1974 through 1979, 7the reduction of security concerns
because of detente and the dovish bent of level [two] domestic constituencies
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outcome is a fait accompli. In fact, the United States is in a
unique position to leverage positive outcomes for all parties in-
volved.
II. DISPARATE APPROACHES& PERSPECTIVES
Part II will examine the three prevailing modes of claims set-
tHement 'esoH&tion st'ateLies^ 6Je Mi'st seQtionb O&lleO 7Ame'i`
Qan A**'oaQJesb5 jiHH Hook at *'e%aiHinL 4^8^ attit&Oes 'eLa'OinL
claims resolution across three fronts (official policy, business
sector, and think tank), best captured by the three major works
examined in this Note, namely the Creighton Report (official pol-
icy), the Ashby Proposal (business sector), and the Feinberg Pro-
posal (think tank). The second section, dubleO 7C&lan A*`
*'oaQJesb5 jiHH eiamine tJe 'Jeto'iQ QominL o&t oM tJe Cast'o
regime regarding claims settlement solutions. It will also ques-
tion whether U.S. official policy (Cuba is not willing to settle)
matches actual Cuban government practice (Castro proposed a
settlement as early as 1964). The third and final section, dubbed
7Zo'eiLn A**'oaQJesb5 jiHH present an overview of claims settle-
ments Cuba has reached with five countries other than the
spawned two interludes of negotiations aimed at normalizing relations.5 Id.
Then, the tension switched back, and from 1979 through 1991, 7security issues
reemerged as detente was replaced by renewed Cold War tensions[, and] . . .
the rise of the hawkish Cuban American lobby reconfigured the domestic po-
litical balance to reinforce the U.S. government’s policy of hostility.5 Id. Enter-
ing the modern period, LeoGrande speculates that a 7policy of engagement
would give the Cuban government an incentive to continue cooperating on im-
migration issues, whereas hostility aggravates the economic difficulties that
increase emigration pressures.5 Id. Complicating the issue is the fact that dur-
ing 7noncrisis periods,5 the Cuban American lobby exercises its 7preponderant
power5 in the level two domestic game, which serves as a 7serious obstacle to
formulating level [one] policy positions that might avert new crises.5 Id. at 83.
Putnam Theory is applicable to the debate over resolution of outstanding
claims. See id. at 67N68. It is in this author’s view that any U.S. leader looking
to set forth a realistic plan to resolve the outstanding FCSC claims (which,
pursuant to the Helms-Burton Act, is a prerequisite to full restoration and nor-
malization of relations) must carefully consider the claims of all three groups
whose interests are at stake, not just those of U.S. nationals with FCSC-
certified claims. See id. at 80N83. Continued hostility in the form that Senator
Rubio suggests (summarily dismissing Cuban claims) will only serve to 7aggra-
vate5 the situation (foiling the level one international game), whereas finding
Cuban American claims 7inapplicable5 will disenfranchise the constituency
whose support is most needed (foiling the level two domestic game). See id. at
67N68; see also infra Part III.
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United States. The five settlements provide models for evaluat-
ing C&la’s M&t&'e la'LaininL *osition anO *'eMe'enQes in neLoti`
ating a claims settlement with the United States.
A. American Approaches
As noted earlier, the three American works that follow form
the bedrock of existing analysis on the subject of settling Amer-
ican property claims with Cuba. While the 2015 Creighton Re-
port is exhaustive, it fails to meaningfully consider the Cuban
[iiHe Comm&nith’s QHaims o' Q'oss-claims by Cuba. The Ashby
Proposal aims for a speedy resolution, but it similarly fails to
meaninLM&HHh QonsiOe' eitJe' oM tJese OistinQt L'o&*s’ QHaims^
The Feinberg Proposal is optimistic and grapples with some of
the thornier issues addressed in the other two works, yet it also
falls short of presenting a holistic solution for all involved par-
ties. Each of these works share one common theme: recognizing
Ame'iQan QHaims as 7HeLitimateb5 jJiHe OismissinL otJe' *a'ties’
claims as dubious at best.
1. C'eiLJton 4ni%e'sith’s E\\? :'o*osaH
In October 2015, USAID awarded Creighton University a
$750,000 U8r L'ant 7to Oe%eHo* a moOeH Mo' a *'o*e'th QHaims
settHement meQJanism letjeen C&la anO tJe 4niteO 8tates^5102
Led by Patrick J. Borchers,103 Creighton University gathered a
team of three law faculty members and three political science
faculty members, with support from graduate students at both
schools.104 6Je olIeQt oM tJe st&Oh jas to *'o%iOe 7a tem*Hate to
be utilized by the United States Government in future negotia-
tions with a post-Cast'o OemoQ'atiQ 'eLime in Xa%ana^5105
The Creighton Report, given its direct funding from the United
States, is pegged to the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, the definitive
and still-current statement of official U.S. policy towards
Cuba.106 The Helms-Burton Act predicates resumption of rela-
102. See CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 2.
103. Id. Borchers is 7Vice President for Academic Affairs, Professor and for-
mer Dean5 of Creighton University’s Law School. Id. Borchers also served as
the Creighton Report’s Principal Investigator. Id.
104. See id.
105. Id.
106. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, supra
note 97. See generally CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26.
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tions on the resolution of outstanding claims, but it also envi-
sions a foundational shift to a democratic form of government in
C&lab 7seekinL a M&HH-scale transition to democratic govern-
anQe^5107 This premise presages the breakdown of diplomatic ne-
gotiations between theUnited States and Cuba, even before they
have had a chance to begin. While the call for democracy in Cuba
can be heard in private conversations with Cuban nationals and
seen in various blogs and websites, the assumption that the es-
tablishment of democracy in Cuba is a prerequisite to settling
outstanding claims is the mark of a particularly American brand
of western arrogance.108 If anything, the reverse is true. The set-
tlement of outstanding claims is a prerequisite to the sustained
warming of relations between the United States and Cuba and
107. See CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 15.
108. See Julia E. Sweig & Michael J. Bustamante, Cuba After Communism:
The Economic Reforms That Are Transforming the Island, 92 FOREIGN AFF.
101, 114 (2013) (arguing that when Raúl Castro’s successor, Díaz-Canel, 7takes
the reins, Cuba in all likelihood will continue to defy post-Cold War American
fantasies even as it moves further away from its orthodox socialist past. For
the remaining members of Cuba’s founding revolutionary generation, such a
delicate transformation provides a last opportunity to shape their legacy. For
Cubans born after 1991, the coming years may offer a chance to begin leaving
behind the state of prolonged ideological and economic limbo in which they
were raised.5). See also SorayaM. Castro Mariño,U.S.-Cuban Relations during
the Clinton Administration, 29 LAT. AM. PERSPECTIVES 47, 62 (2002) (arguing
that the 7spirit and the letter of [the Helms-Burton Act] demonstrated the es-
sential conflict existing between Cuba and the United States: sovereignty ver-
sus domination. That ideological aversion to socialism as a political and social
model was only an excuse was revealed by the fact that the United States had
achieved commercial and diplomatic understandings with China and Vi-
etnam.5). Castro Mariño quotes Harvard professor Jorge Domínguez, who once
observed:
The Helms-Burton Act is quite faithful to the theme of the
Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary. It claims for
the United States the unilateral right to decide a wide array
of domestic policies and arrangements in a nominally sover-
eign post-Castro Cuba. In the Monroe Doctrine, the United
States asserted its right to specify which system of govern-
ment was acceptable in the Americas. In the Roosevelt Cor-
ollary, the U.S. government claimed the additional right to
stipulate specific economic and other policies and specifically
to redress the nonpayment of debts.
Id. (emphasis added).
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movement towards the various freedoms and rights guaranteed
in a democratic society.109
Admittedly, the Creighton Report recognizes that while the
Helms-!&'ton QonOitions 7Ja%e some ol%io&s me'itb JinLinL 'es`
olution of long-festering property issues on dramatic changes in
Lo%e'nment mah *'o%e l&'Oensome^5110 The Creighton Report
aHso aQknojHeOLes tJat 7tJe *'olaliHith oM s&QQession is in some
ways far more likely than full-scale transition in the short and
(possibly) medium term—as we have seen in the last year with
tJe asQension oM 9aFH Cast'o^5111 This latter assessment proved
to le t'&eb at Heast in te'ms oM 9aFH Cast'ob 7jJose seQonO anO
final five year term in office will [only] come to an end in early
E\G>^5112 Who succeeds Raúl Castro remains to be seen, but it is
unlikely that there will be any marked shift towards a more
democratic form of government. Indeed, the pro-reform voices in
Cuba are growing in volume and number, but the 7more ortho-
dox thinkers within the government and the [Partido Comunista
de Cuba, i.e., the Communist Part of Cuba] seem to have . . . the
&**e' JanO at e%e'h t&'n^5113 As such, the Creighton Report au-
thors do not go far enough in warning against the geopolitical
pitfall of putting the cart before the horse and prioritizing a dem-
ocratic transition ahead of the settlement of claims.
In its Executive Summary, the Creighton Report starts by
identifying the following three classes of property claimants:
U.S. National Claimants, Cuban Exile Community Claimants,
and Cuban Claimants Still in Cuba.114 The first group, U.S. Na-
tional Claimants, includes both natural and non-natural per-
sonsb inQH&OinL 7Ame'iQan inOi%iO&aHs anO Qo'*o'ations jJo
were Americans at the time of the unlawful expropriation
(mostly in 1959 and the osiQn ea'Hh G=@\d^5115 These persons have
109. See Kathleen C. Schwartzman, Can International Boycotts Transform
Political Systems? The Cases of Cuba and South Africa, 43 LAT. AM. POL’YSOC’Y
115, 115N16, 140 (2001) (arguing that the Embargo, and by extension the
Helms-Burton Act, 7cannot have its intended results,5 as international boy-
cotts are not decisive in transforming political systems. . . . Change will come,
but if comparative history offers a lesson, it will not be through economic sanc-
tions.5).
110. CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 16.
111. Id.
112. See FEINBERG, supra note 3, at 65.
113. See id. at 72.
114. CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 3.
115. Id.
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certified their claims through the FCSC, and as previously de-
scribed, the current value of outstanding claims approaches $7
billion USD.116 Moreover, the Helms-Burton Act further precon-
ditions the lifting of the Embargo and the resumption of full eco-
nomic and diplomatic relations between the United States and
C&la on 7tJe satisMaQto'h 'esoH&tion oM *'o*e'th QHaims lh a C&`
lan Yo%e'nment 'eQoLnigeO lh tJe 4niteO 8tates^5117 If the re-
Me''eO to 7*'o*e'th QHaims5 a'e OeMineO as the outstanding claims
certified by the FCSC, both the Creighton Report and prevailing
U.S. policy take for granted the legitimacy and value of the
claims asserted by Americans. This is a fatal strategic and dip-
lomatic flaw.118
The second group, Cuban Exile Community Claimants, in-
QH&Oes inOi%iO&aHs jJo 7je'e C&lan at tJe time oM tJe ei*'o*'i`
ation oM tJei' *'o*e'th^5119 The Creighton Report suggests that
tJis 7seQonO L'o&* oM *'o*e'th QHaims is JeHO lhC&lan-American
eiiHesobn5 l&t tJe OeMinition sJo&HO le expanded to include Cuban
exiles who fled to, live(d) in, and became nationals of states other
than the United States. While the majority of Cubans sought
asylum in the United States, many Cuban exiles ended up else-
where, including Canada, Spain, Mexico, France, and the United
UinLOom^ 6Je C'eiLJton 9e*o't Qo''eQtHh notes tJat 7leQa&se
members of this claimant group were nationals of Cuba when
their property was expropriated, international law does not rec-
oLnige 'iLJt oM 'eQo%e'h^5120 This fact, however, should not serve
as an auto-exclusionarymechanism, due in large part to political
anO eQonomiQ MaQto's^ [%en tJo&LJ 7QHaims lh tJis L'o&* a'e not
[technically] supported by either domestic or international
Hajb5121 ignoring their claims would undermine attempts to re-
solve claims on behalf of other groups. Politically, Cuban exiles,
*a'tiQ&Ha'Hh C&lan Ame'iQan eiiHesb enIoh 7s&**o't amonL *oH`
icy-makers in Washington and activism against the [Castro] re-
Lime make tJem a L'o&* tJat Qannot le iLno'eO^5122 Economi-
cally, C&lan eiiHes jo&HO HikeHh le 7amonL tJe Mi'st in%esto's in
116. See Neyfakh, supra note 22.
117. CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 3.
118. See infra Part III.
119. CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 3.
120. Id. at 4.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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an o*en C&lan ma'ketobn5 anO aHienatinL tJis L'o&* jo&HO *'e`
QH&Oe tJei' inM&sion oM Qa*itaH into C&lab jJiQJ jo&HO 7JeH* to
jump-start the Cuban economy . . . and could do much to spark
the suppressed but ever-present entrepreneurial spirit of the
C&lan *eo*He^5123 From a geopolitical perspective, acknowledg-
ing and settling the Cuban Exile Community claims could prove
to be the key lynchpin in turning the tide of American policy at-
titudes towards Cuba.124
The third group, Cuban Claimants Still in Cuba, includes in-
dividuals who were and remain(ed) nationals of Cuba at the time
of, and following, the nationalization of property.125 The
C'eiLJton 9e*o't notes tJat tJese 7QHaims a'ejJoHHh an inte'naH
matter fo' C&la to 'esoH%eobn5 anO aQQo'OinLHhb 7otnJe'e is no in`
te'nationaH Oimension to tJem^5126 While in principle this latter
statement may be true, in practice, the voices and claims of Cu-
ban claimants still in Cuba will be critical to the successful res-
olution oM otJe' L'o&*s’ QHaims^ 8&QQessM&H im*Hementation oM a
QHaims 'esoH&tion meQJanismjiHH 'e(&i'e C&lan QHaimants’ s&*`
*o'tb leQa&se iM 7C&lans in C&la ^ ^ ^ %iej tJe settHement *'oQess
as a venue for capital flight from the island, then they will not
suppo't it^5127 If they do not support it, the prospect of creating
a political and economic environment supportive of and recep-
tive to the outcomes of settlement (and other items on the West-
ern agenda, such as a transition to democracy) will prove a diffi-
cult, if not insurmountable, obstacle.128
The Executive Summary also proposes the following two main
vehicles of claims settlements: A Cuba-U.S. Claims Tribunal
ftJe 76'il&naH5d anO a C&lan 8*eQiaH CHaims Co&'t ftJe 7CHaims
Co&'t5d^129 The Cuba-U.S. Claims Tribunal jo&HO 7le estal`
lished by bilateral treaty or executive agreement between a suc-
Qesso' Lo%e'nment to tJe Cast'o 'eLime anO tJe4^8^5130 The Tri-
l&naH jo&HO Ja%e 7inte'nationaH HeLaH Qa*aQith as an a'lit'aH
loOhobn5 anO its soHe *&'*ose jo&HO le 7to 'esoH%e o&tstanding
property dispute issues between Cuba and the United States
123. Id.
124. See discussion supra note 101; see also infra Part III.
125. See CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 4.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See discussion supra note 101; see also infra Part III.
129. CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 5N6.
130. Id. at 5.
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anO tJe 'es*eQti%e nationaHs tJe'eoM^5131 The Tribunal would
Ja%e 7a&tJo'ith to *'om&HLate '&Hes oM *'oQeO&'eb5 7tJe *oje' to
o'Oe' inte'im meas&'es oM 'eHieMb5 anO tJe aliHith to 7a**Hh inter-
nationaH Haj to 'esoH%e tJe QHaims leMo'e it^5132 Claims would be
settled primarily through two mechanisms. Small claims, de-
MineO as tJose 7o%e' jJiQJ tJe 6'il&naH Jas I&'isOiQtion anO in
which recovery of $10,000.00 [USD] or less, exclusive of any
claim for interest, is sought and is brought by a national against
a Yo%e'nmentobn5133 jo&HO le 7Qom*ensateO moneta'iHh tJ'o&LJ
a st'eamHineO *'oQess^5134 Medium and large claims, defined un-
Oe' simiHa' te'msb l&t 'anLinL M'om 7mo'e tJan .G\b\\\^\\
[USD] but less than .EA\b\\\^\\ o48rn5 anO 7mo'e tJan
.EA\b\\\ o48rbn5135 'es*eQti%eHhb Qo&HO aHso 7le Qom*ensateO
monetarily, by specific restitution (under limited circum-
stances), or by alternative remedy awarded by the Government
against which the claim is brought in the form of development
rights, tax credits, rights in Government-owned property, or
otJe' 'emeOies OesiLneO to *'omote Mo'eiLn in%estment5136 in
Cuba, assuming these alternatives are satisfactory to each
claimant. The Tribunal would operate to resolve the first and
tJi'O L'o&*’s QHaims f4^8^ RationaHCHaimants anOC&lan CHaim`
ants Still in Cuba).137
8inQe tJe C&lan [iiHe Comm&nith’s QHaims a'e not teQJniQaHHh
recognized under international law, their claims are proposed to
be resolved by a Cuban Special Claims Court.138 Much like its
6'il&naH Qo&nte'*a'tb tJe CHaims Co&'t jo&HO 7le estalHisJeO
by bilateral treaty or executive agreement between a successor
Lo%e'nment to tJe Cast'o 'eLime anO tJe 4^8^obn5 l&t 'atJe'
tJan o*e'atinL &nOe' inte'nationaH Hajb it jo&HO 7le an inde-
*enOent QJamle' jitJin tJe C&lan I&OiQiaH shstemobn5 jo&HO
Ja%e soHe 7a&tJo'ith to *'om&HLate its '&Hes oM *'oQeO&'eb anO
w[ould] conduct business according to the arbitration rules
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 147.
134. Id. at 5.
135. Id. at 148.
136. Id. at 5.
137. See id. at 5N6.
138. See id. at 6.
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promulgated in 1976 by the United Nations Commission on In-
ternational T'aOe Taj^5139 Further, the Claims Court would de-
QiOe aHH Qases 7on tJe lasis oM Qi%iH Hajb *a'tiQ&Ha'Hh as Oe'i%eO
M'om tJe 8*anisJ Ci%iH CoOe oM G>>=^5140 Much like the Tribunal,
the Claims Court would settle claims based on whether they
qualify as small, medi&mb o' Ha'Le^ 6Je CHaims Co&'t’s aja'Os
jo&HO le 7MinaHb linOinL anO M&HHh enMo'QealHe jitJin C&la anO
tJe 4niteO 8tates^5141
The problems endemic to this approach are twofold. First, the
Creighton Report approach suggests, both structurally and di-
dacticallhb a 7*eQkinL o'Oe'5 oM QHaims^ 4^8^ RationaH CHaimants’
claims are to be resolved first, followed by Cuban Exile Commu-
nity Claimants, and then by Cuban Claimants Still in Cuba.142
While this may seem natural to politicians and diplomats who
view the United States as the center of the geopolitical sphere,
it is antithetical to that favored by the Castro regime, its likely
successors, many (if not the majority of) Cubans, and various
otJe' statesb jJo aHH sJa'e 7simiHa' %iejs on 3antiJeLemonism’
anO 3noninte'%ention’ aHonL jitJ *'eMe'enQes Mo' a mo'e m&Hti`
*oHa' jo'HO o'Oe'^5143 If the United States is to approach the set-
tlement of claims seriously, it must treat all claimants as being
on equal footing. To position U.S. national and Cuban Exile
QHaimants 7aJeaO5 of Cuban claimants would sound the death
knell of the claims settlement process, which in turn would fur-
tJe' Ieo*a'Oige anO staHH tJe 4niteO 8tates’ &Htimate LoaH oM see`
ing a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.144
Second, the Creighton Report (in its 250-plus pages) dedicates
aHH oM tjo *a'aL'a*Js on one *aLe to 7C'oss CHaims lh C&la^5145
This demonstrates the extent to which they have been thought-
fully considered as part and parcel of the overall claims settle-
ment process. Cross-claims by Cuba146 include, but are not lim-
iteO tob 7eQonomiQ Hosses5 stemminL *'ima'iHh M'om tJe [mla'Lo
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 3.
143. See FEINBERG, supra note 3, at 54.
144. See infra Part III.
145. See CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 5.
146. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 6N7, 12N15 (addressing Cuban cross-
claims).
2018] Outstanding American Property Claims in Cuba 571
7anO to't QHaims^5147 Because of the difficulty in distinguishing
7letjeen Ja'm Oone lh tJe emla'Lo anO tJat Oone lh tJe C&lan
Lo%e'nmentb5 tJe C'eiLJton a&tJo's s&mma'iHh anO neatHh Qon`
QH&Oe tJatb 7it is im*ossilHe to %e'iMh tJe QHaims anO QHaim
amo&nts^5148 They emphasize that 7otno tJe eitent tJat C&lan
claims are allowed [at all], making the claim settlement process
a two-way street, only valid property-based claims should be
QonsiOe'eO &nOe' tJe I&'isOiQtion oM tJe liHate'aH 6'il&naH^5149
This last qualification is drenched in skepticism.150
This latter line of rhetoric is counterproductive and potentially
inQenOia'hb as tJe C&lan Lo%e'nment’s Q&''ent *osition is not
likely to change.151 As just discussed, the Cuban government
maintains tJe eiistenQe oM 7tjo QateLo'ies oM QHaims< economic
damages from the long-standing U.S. economic sanctions, and
personal injury damages sustained by Cubans killed or harmed
lh aHHeLeO 4^8^ JostiHities^ ^ ^ ^5152 The claims include, but are not
HimiteO tob 7.D^> liHHion o48rn Mo' Hosses in tJe to&'ist industry[,]
. . . $200 million [USD] for the purchase of sugarcane crop equip-
ment to substitute for U.S.-manufactured equipment[,] . . . [and]
CIA-supported hostilities in Cuba resulting in 549 deaths be-
tween 1959NG=@A aHone^ ^ ^ ^5153 Despite the difficulty verifying
the parties responsible for the damages (posited by the
C'eiLJton 9e*o't a&tJo'sdb 7a Hajs&it jent Mo'ja'O in C&lan
Court in May 1999 asserting massive tort claims against the
U.S. for human losses and hardships flowing from the em-
la'Lo^5154 Following the presentation of evidence over a thirteen-
day period (and the lack of a formal response from the United
147. CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 5. See also infra Part II.
148. CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 5.
149. Id.
150. See id. The Creighton Report acknowledges the possibility of settling
claims related to 7frozen assets of the Cuban government[,]5 but otherwise sug-
gests that most 7Cuban claims, including tort claims, should be undertaken
within the domestic Cuban judicial system and treated as normal litigation. . .
. Cases alleging other bases for compensation [simply] fall outside the jurisdic-
tion of the judicial bodies recommended for establishment[,]5 including the Tri-
bunal and the Claims Court. See id.
151. See discussion supra note 108; see also infra Part III.
152. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 13.
153. Id.
154. CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 5.
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8tatesdb tJe C&lan Qo&'t 7aja'OeO OamaLes oM .G>G^G liHHion
o48rn anO o'Oe'eO tJe 4^8^ to a*oHoLige^5155
In the face of U.S. obstinance regarding the legitimacy of Cu-
ban counter-claims (and their relevance to the claims settlement
process, which is limited to property claims and purportedly ex-
cludes most Cuban claims), official Cuban policy has in turn
maintained a hardline approach. As discussed earlier, one Cu-
lan Oi*Homat Jas OeQHa'eO tJat tJe QHaims iss&e Qo&HO le 7Oe`
cided easily and quickly: simply offset U.S claims with Cuban
counter-QHaims25156 Offsetting the $181.1 billion USD owed to
Cuba with the estimated $7 billion USD owed to the U.S. nation-
als would leave the United States with a debt of $174.1 billion
USD. The United States is not likely to entertain such a debt. Of
Qo&'seb tJe'e is HoLiQ leJinO tJe C'eiLJton a&tJo's’ intent to
limit the claims settlement process to property claims, but sum-
ma'iHh OismissinL C&lan Qo&nte' QHaims as 7ina**HiQalHe5 jo&HO
likely lead to a breakdown of negotiations before they meaning-
fully begin.157 !h s&LLestinL tJat 4^8^ nationaHs’ QHaims sJo&HO
le *'io'itigeO o%e' otJe' L'o&*s’ QHaimsb anO insistinL tJat C&`
ban counter claims have no or little place in the claims settle-
ment process, the Creighton Report renders its proposed settle-
ment mechanisms impracticable.
2. 6imotJh AsJlh’s E\\= :'o*osaH
In 2009, the University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
published a skeptical article authored by Timothy Ashby, enti-
tHeO 74^8^ Ce'tiMieO CHaims ALainst C&la< TeLaH 9eaHith anO
TikeHh 8ettHement SeQJanisms^5158 Much like the 2007
Creighton Report,159 AsJlh’s a'tiQHe OisQ&sses tJe tjo most
HikeHh o*tions Mo' settHementb 7TitiLation in a C&lan Co&'t5 anO
a 7!iHate'aH :'o*e'th CHaims 8ettHement 6'il&naH^5160 To these
two options, Ashby contributes a third proposed mechanism, a
78*eQiaH 8it&ations Z&nOb5 tojJiQJ QHaim JoHOe'sjo&HO t'ansMe'
155. Id.; see also infra Part II.
156. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 12.
157. See discussions supra notes 101, 108; see also infra Part III.
158. See generally Ashby, supra note 20.
159. See id. at 426, n.55. Surprisingly, Ashby only cites the Creighton Report
once, and only with respect to the Creighton Report’s discussion of a bilateral
Tribunal. See id.
160. Id. at 424N25.
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anO seHH tJei' QHaims 7Mo' a *'emi&m o%e' what they could rea-
sonably expect to receive in a bilateral settlement negotiated by
tJe 4^8^ Lo%e'nment^5161 Ashby suggests this third option repre-
sents tJe 7o*timaH soH&tion Mo' aHH stakeJoHOe's ^ ^ ^ tJat a%oiOs
contentious and protracted diplomatic negotiation^5162
Ashby limits discussion of the potential for litigation in a Cu-
ban court to one paragraph. After addressing the potential quag-
mire of travel restrictions imposed on claim holders wishing to
travel from the United States to Cuba for the purpose of litigat-
ing their claims in Cuban courts (which may no longer be rele-
vant following the Obama AOminist'ation’s easinL oM t'a%eH 'e`
strictions), Ashby contemplates the inherent difficulties in en-
LaLinL 7HoQaH Qo&nseH anO enO&'oinLn a HenLtJh anO ei*ensi%e Hit-
igation process to establish rights to compensation, followed by
%aH&ation oM tJe QHaim lh tJe C&lan Lo%e'nment^5163 Ashby pos-
itsb 7oe%enn iM tJe aQtion *'o%eO s&QQessM&Hb tJe *HaintiMM jo&HO aH`
most certainly receive bonds in compensation for the assets
taken JaHM a Qent&'h aLoobn5 jJiQJ *'es&malHh jo&HO le oM HittHe
value to claimants.164 Z&'tJe'b 7o&nnOe' Q&''ent 4^8^ Hajb it
would be illegal to receive Cuban sovereign bonds as payment,
as tJese jo&HO le OeemeO 3an inte'est in C&lan *'o*e'th^’5165
Next, Ashby addresses the potential for a Bilateral Property
Claims Settlement Tribunal,166 much like the one offered by the
C'eiLJton 9e*o't^ AsJlh notes tJat s&QJ a 6'il&naH 7jo&HO le
similar to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, an international arbi-
tral tribunal located in the Hague, which took many years to re-
soH%e o&tstanOinL QHaims Mo' assets nationaHigeO lh W'an^5167
Z'om tJis anaHoLhb AsJlh inMe's tJat 7olniHate'aH settHement ne`
LotiationsjitJ C&lajo&HO simiHa'Hh le a *'ot'aQteO *'oQess^5168
There is logic behind the inference that negotiations would be a
long and arduous process, but the protraction would more likely
be attached to the negotiations over which settlement mecha-
nisms should prevail.169 Once settlement mechanism(s) are
161. Id. at 428.
162. Id. at 431.
163. Id. at 425.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 425 (citing 31 C.F.R. § 515.311(a) (2003)).
166. See id. at 425N28.
167. Id. at 426.
168. Id.
169. See discussion supra note 101; see also infra Part III.
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agreed to, the process may be a swift one, as claimants are eager
to minimize their costs and receive their settlements, while both
the United States and Cuba are eager to normalize relations
(with settlement of claims being among the most critical first
steps).
AsJlh aHso 'eQaHHs tJat tJe 7C&lan government emphatically
does not agree with the valuations of the FCSC, which were not
estalHisJeO in aO%e'sa'iaH *'oQeeOinLs5 anO jJiQJb jitJo&t in`
te'estb amo&nt to 7aHmost Oo&lHe tJe .=A@ miHHion o48rn look
value of all U.S. investments in Cuba as repo'teO in G=@G^5170 To
Jis Q'eOitb AsJlh &nOe'sQo'es tJe MaQt tJat 7C&la Jas tjo maIo'
Qo&nte'QHaims aLainst tJe 4niteO 8tates5 anO tJat lh 7C&lan
law, the Cuban counterclaimsmust be considered part of the set-
tHement neLotiation *'oQess^5171 Ashby, however, could not have
anticipated the election of Donald J. Trump when he suggested
tJe *'olaliHith tJat 74^8^ neLotiato'sb &nOe' *'ess&'e M'om tJe
Obama administration and the business lobby to quickly reach
a settlement so that relations with Cuba could be normalized,
would agree to use the original book value figure of $956 million
o48rn^5172 While the business lobby remains, the Trump Admin-
istration, under its own pressure from the powerful Cuban
American lobby, is not likely to be as amenable to making con-
cessions to the Cuban government, which is still under the con-
trol of the Castro regime.
AsJlh neit t&'ns to Jis *'o*osaH Mo' 78*eQiaH 8it&ations
Z&nOsb5 jJiQJ jo&HO oMMe' *'i%ate means Mo' settHement oM
claims.173 6Je M&nOs 7jo&HO Ja%e to aQ(&i'e a Ha'Le aLL'eLate
amount of claims and hold them until a time in the future—a
3jinOoj oM o**o't&nith’—when it could settle the claims via a
debt-for-equity or debt-for-property swap with the Cuban gov-
e'nment^5174 As precedent for this type of arrangement, Ashby
notesb 7C&la is known to have negotiated at least two debt-for-
asset swaps with private concerns (Mexican and Argentine) to
170. See Ashby, supra note 20, at 426.
171. See id. at 427.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 428. In essence, private interest capitalists, who are seeking
to hedge inherent risks with an eye toward capitalizing on the potential for fee
arrangements with the U.S. and Cuban governments, and settling claims at
rates above those paid to the original claim holders, would establish 7interna-
tional special situations funds (specializing in distressed debt). . . .5 See id.
174. Id. at 430.
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settHe so%e'eiLn Oelt *&'QJaseO at a stee* OisQo&nt^5175While the
benefits of such Fund(s) are clear, it remains to be seen whether
private interests would be willing to take on the massive risk
inherent in purchasing such claims. The fact that there is prec-
edent for such an arrangement is a ray of hope, but ultimately,
the Ashby Proposal is plagued with the same problems as the
proposals set forth in the Creighton Report.
AsJlh’s *'o*osaH Mo' 8*eQiaH 8it&ations Z&nOfsd is Oe%oiO oM
meaningful consideration of the cross-claims asserted by the Cu-
ban government. In his nineteen page article, Ashby dedicates
exactly one sentence to the reality of Cuban cross-claims, and to
that end, he does not even bother to unpack what those cross-
QHaims a'eb sim*Hh statinL tJat tJe tjo QateLo'ies oM 7Qo&nte'`
QHaims5 eiist^176 As previously discussed, the Cuban government
is unlikely to enter into negotiations under the premise that its
own claims against the U.S. government and U.S. nationals are
7ina**HiQalHe^5177 While it is true that tort claims of the kind con-
templated by the Castro regime are more appropriately contem-
*HateO o&tsiOe tJe 'eaHm oM a 7*'o*e'th QHaims settHement mech-
anismb5 tJe eQonomiQ OamaLes anO *e'sonaH inI&'ies s&MMe'eO lh
the Cuban people will not soon be forgotten.178 Just as the set-
tHement oM 4^8^ nationaHs’ QHaims is a Q'itiQaH Mi'st ste* toja'Os
the United States resuming full economic and diplomatic rela-
tionsb so too is tJe settHement oM C&la’s QHaims a neQessa'h *'e`
requisite for entering into the same process.179 Because both na-
tions are eager to normalize relations (as both nations have so
much to gain and lose), each must meaningfully and respectfully
QonsiOe' tJe otJe'’s QHaims^
3. 9iQJa'O Zeinle'L’s E\GA :'o*osaH
In 2015, the Latin America Initiative at Brookings180 pub-
lished a comprehensive policy paper authored by none other
175. Id.
176. See id. at 427.
177. See infra Part III.
178. See infra Part III.
179. See discussion supra note 101; see also infra Part III.
180. See BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, https://www.brookings.edu/about-us/ (last
visited Jan. 8, 2017). Formed in 1916, The Brookings Institution is a Washing-
ton, D.C.-based think tank whose mission is 7to conduct in-depth research that
leads to new ideas for solving problems facing society at the local, national and
global level.5 Id.
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tJan 9iQJa'O [^ Zeinle'Lb entitHeO 79eQonQiHinL 4^8^ :'o*e'th
Claims in C&la< 6'ansMo'minL 6'a&ma into;**o't&nith^5181 Ra-
ther than offering an exhaustive technical guide182 or a brief law
review article,183 Feinberg contributes a nuanced policy proposal
through which he adds two additional solutions to those offered
by the Creighton Report and the Ashby Proposal: an all-inclusive
lump-sum settlement and a hybrid formula, two-tiered ap-
proach.184 Feinberg ultimately finds in favor of the latter hybrid
formula, which proposes a two-tiered solution whereby smaller,
individual claimants receive whole or partial financial compen-
sation while larger, often corporate, claimants select an opt-out
option, electing to pursue and resolve their claims directly with
C&lan a&tJo'ities tJ'o&LJ a %a'ieth oM inst'&ments 7aHte'na`
ti%e5 to MinanQiaH Qom*ensation^185
After providing a thoughtful introduction and overview,186 a
l'eakOojn oM tJe 4niteO 8tates’ anO C&la’s 'espective positions
regarding the Castro nationalizations and prospects for compen-
sation,187 anO tJe 7keh Qont'o%e'sies5 s&''o&nOinL tJe ZC8C
claims,188 Zeinle'L sketQJes o&t Jis tjo 7Z'amejo'ks Mo' 9eQon`
QiHiation^5189 The first proffered solution revolves around an all-
inclusive, lump-sum settlement, whereby the United States en-
ters into a settlement with Cuba to pay some agreed-upon
amount.190 Then, the U.S. Treasury Department would disburse
tJe *'oQeeOs on a *'o 'ata lasisb 7*e'Ja*s jitJ a minim&m *ah`
ment to all QHaimants fsah .G\b\\\ o48rnd^5191 Feinberg notes
that since World War II, lump-s&m settHements Ja%e leen 7tJe
*'eMe''eO meQJanism5 oM tJe 4niteO 8tates anO otJe' Oe%eHo*eO
181. See generally FEINBERG, supra note 17. Feinberg’s policy paper was, and
remains, the most up-to-date and authoritative analysis of the outstanding
property claims, a cross-disciplinary project for which 7lawyers, diplomats, so-
cial scientists, and political leaders5 were consulted. Id. at iii.
182. See generally CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26. The Creighton Re-
port runs in excess of 250 pages. Id.
183. See generally Ashby, supra note 20. The Ashby Proposal comes in at
nineteen pages. Id.
184. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 28, 30.
185. See id. at 4, 25N34.
186. See id. at 1N5.
187. See id. at 6N15.
188. See id. at 16N24.
189. See id. at 25N34.
190. See id. at 28.
191. Id.
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nations when tackling domestic nationalizations of foreigner-
owned properties.192
In a lump-sum settlement, two state governments negotiate an
all-inclusive total amount of financial compensation that is
transferred in one lump-sum to the plaintiff government.193 The
lump-sum constitutes a global indemnity guaranteed to the de-
fendant government, and the plaintiff government is charged
with distributing the monies to its national claimants.194 From
the perspective of the plaintiff government, lump-sum settle-
ments oMMe' %a'io&s leneMitsb inQH&OinL 7eMMiQienQh in Qo*inL jitJ
large numbers of claims; . . . consistency in the administration
and adjudication of claims; . . . fairness among claimants in set-
tinL Q'ite'ia Mo' e%aH&atinL QHaims anO Oist'il&tinL aja'Os#5 anO
greater leverage, which effectively preempts the defendant gov-
ernment from adopting a 7Oi%iOe anO Qon(&e'5 st'ateLh^195 From
the perspective of the defendant government, lump-sum settle-
ments Qon%enientHh 7a%oiO anh aOmission oM j'onL-doing. Nei-
ther state is called upon to admit . . . the validity of the accusa-
tions of the other state, nor to make politically painful apolo-
Lies^5196 Zeinle'L s&LLests tJatb 7oans a '&Heb H&m*-sum settle-
ments Ja%e Mo&nO tJat 3aOe(&ate’ *ahment ^ ^ ^ amo&nted to less-
than-M&HH Qom*ensation^5197
The proposed lump-sum settlement between the United States
and Cuba would thus not likely include the simple interest con-
templated by the Cuban Claims Program or even the full amount
of principal.198 While a single transfer would be optimal from the
vantage point of the United States and its claimants, Feinberg
s&LLests tJat 7oonne [perhaps more realistic] variant would per-
mit the Cuban government to pay in installments over a number
192. See id. at 25. See also infra Part II.
193. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 25.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 26. Feinberg observes that a 7seminal study of 69 lump-sum
settlement agreements among nations found that partial payment of principal
has been the rule, often without interest[,]5 but he notes that the study’s au-
thors 7cautioned . . . that lump sum settlements have often been linked to-
gether with quid pro quos 3which are well-nigh impossible to assess.’5 Id. (citing
BURNS H. WESTON, RICHARD B. LILLICH & DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL
CLAIMS: THEIRSETTLEMENT BYLUMP SUMAGREEMENTS, 1975-1995, 85, 96 (New
York: Transnational Publishers, Inc. 1999)).
198. See id. at 25N34.
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oM hea's^ ^ ^ ^5199WJiHe Zeinle'L 'esists tJe s&LLestion 7tJat C&la
is too *oo'5 to *ah laQk tJe M&HH .G^= liHHion 48r in *'inQi*aH oM
FCSC-certified claims, his analysis of two key ratios200 reveals
that Cuba may only be capable of managing these payments if
tJe *ahments a'e eitenOeO o%e' a 7'easonalHe5 timeM'ame anO
interest payments are excluded.201
Feinberg suggests that interest payments are impracticable
for a variety of reasons, including: the likelihood that the Cuban
government would resist heavy interest charges; the burden
that interest charges would place on the already-fragile Cuban
eQonomh# tJe MaQt tJat inMo'meO 7C&lans a'e not aQQ&stomeO to
tJe iOea ^ ^ ^ tJat Qa*itaH Oese'%es to ea'n inte'est inQome5 anO
jo&HO HikeHh *oint to 7ea'Hie' H&m*-s&m settHements5 letjeen
the United States and other defendant governments that fell
7jeHH leHoj tJe ZC8C @ *e'Qent lenQJma'k;5 tJe *oHitiQaH inMea`
sibility oM tJe inQ&mlent C&lan Lo%e'nment ei*HaininL a 7ma'`
ket-O'i%en5 settHement to its *o*&Hation# anO tJe notion tJat a
7*&nisJinL Oelt se'%iQe5 jo&HO le Qo&nte'*'oO&Qti%e Mo' lotJ na`
tions, as it is in their mutual interest to t'ansMo'm C&la into 7a
vibrant economiQ *a'tne' Mo' 4^8^ t'aOe's anO in%esto's^5202
While a lump-sum settlement, legitimized by significant histor-
ical precedent,203 would offer a number of attractive benefits to
both governments, Feinberg speculates that a critical number of
claimants would resist such a settlement, unsatisfied by the pro-
s*eQt oM 7*'inQi*aH-onHh5 fo' Hessd *ahments st'etQJeO o&t o%e' too
many years.204
199. Id. at 28. For this proposition, Feinberg cites to unspecified 7precedents
of agreements that the United States has signed with other countries and that
Cuba previously negotiated with other claimant governments[,]5 including 7the
Cuban settlement with France [that] allowed for 11 equal semi-annual pay-
ments.5 Id. at 28, n. 60.
200. See id. at 28. The two ratios include Cuba’s 7ratio of debt service to ex-
ports, and the ratio of debt service to gross domestic product (GDP).5 Id.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 29.
203. See id. at 30. Feinberg notes that former FCSC Commissioner, Sidney
Friedberg, 7examined 11 lump-sum settlements (in Eastern Europe, Soviet Un-
ion, and China) where the Commission had initially awarded interest charges[,
as is the case with the Cuban Claims Program,] but in only one case did the
final negotiated agreement allow for the actual payments of any interest.5 Id.
204. Id.
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The second proffered solution involves a two-tiered approach,
jJat Zeinle'L QaHHs a 7Jhl'iO Mo'm&Ha^5205 Feinberg suggests
that the two-tiered solution derives its strength and logic from
the structural differences inherent to the FCSC-certified claims
anO QHaimantsb jJiQJ Qan le 7Oi%iOeO as letjeen Qo'*o'ate
claims, which are smaller in number and highly concentrated,
and individual claims which are many in number and generally
m&QJ smaHHe' in sige^5206 Because of these distinctions in magni-
tude, Feinberg argues that the two categories of claims might—
or even should—be handled separately.207
Feinberg observes that of the 5,913 FCSC-certified claims,
5,014 constitute individual claims (the first tier), totaling about
$229 million USD.208 He further observes that of these individ-
ual claims, only thirty-nine were valued at over $1 million USD,
of which only four were valued at over $5 million USD.209 Fein-
le'L *osits tJat Mo' ei*eOienQh’s sake anO as 7a matte' oM e(&ith
amonL tJe QHaimantsb5 it jo&HO le &seM&H to Qa* inOi%iO&aH QHaim
payments at $1 million USD per claim.210 Total claims would be
reduced by $59 million USD. While the larger holders of claims
valued at over $1 million USD might protest, the benefits out-
jeiLJ tJe aO%e'se im*aQts anOb in anh e%entb 7it Qo&HO le a'L&eO
that they were still receiving a non-neLHiLilHe f3non-Oe'isi%e’ in
HeLaH te'minoHoLhd *e'QentaLe oM tJei' QHaim^5211 In this way,
Feinberg argues, individual claims would be reduced to $171
million USD ($229million USD less $59 million USD), a number
certain to be more attractive to the Cuban government.212 Were
the Cuban government to agree to such a settlement, all of the
205. See id. at 30N33.
206. See id. at 30.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 30N31. Feinberg observes that there are 5,913 FCSC-certified
claims, two more than the 5,911 described in Title V of the International
Claims Settlement Act. See discussion supra, note 85. This author has not been
able to reconcile the numerical discrepancy from publicly available sources.
209. See id. at 31.
210. See id. Such a cap would adversely affect only thirty-nine out of 5,014
claimants and is not without historical precedent. See id. Feinberg notes that
caps were utilized 7in some Eastern European property claims settlements fol-
lowing the end of the Cold War. . . .5 Id.
211. Id.
212. See id.
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5,0GB inOi%iO&aH QHaims 7jo&HO le 'esoH%eO in one lHojobn5 Hea%`
ing only the 899 remaining corporate claims.213
This leaves only the second tier corporate claims, which Fein-
le'L olse'%es a'e 7Jea%iHh QonQent'ateO^5214 The top ten corpo-
rate claims alone are valued at almost $1 billion USD, with the
top fifty valued at $1.5 billion USD, while the total value of all
FCSC-certified claims stands at $1.9 billion USD (principal only,
excluding interest).215 Feinberg notes that the final figure may
be substantially less, as some QHaims 7Ja%e *'olalHh not leen
continuously held by U.S. citizens or firms majority-owned by
U.S. citizens and hence are no longer compensable according to
ZC8C '&Hes^5216 Also, the Cuban government itself is likely to
challenge the valuation of the FCSC awards, further diminish-
ing the total value of expected settlement payments.217 Because
tJe Ha'Le' Qo'*o'ate QHaimants MaQe tJe 'isk oM an 7e(&ith Jai'-
Q&tb5218 Zeinle'L *osits tJat it is in tJis L'o&*’s inte'est to 7o*t
o&t5 oM tJe Lene'aH settHement aHtoLetJe' anO insteaO seek aHte'`
native remedies.219
An opt-out option, Feinberg argues, is not without historical
precedent,220 and would present corporate claimants with the op-
portunity to select from a variety of potentially more valuable
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 2, 31.
216. Id. at 31.
217. See id. at 31.
218. Id. If larger corporate claimants choose to 7opt in5 to a general settle-
ment, the settled value of their claims could be substantially reduced 7to limit
the burden on Cuba and to ensure a minimum payment to the smaller claim-
ants. . . .5 Id.
219. See id. For a deeper discussion of alternative remedies, see also id. at 31,
n. 64 (citingMatias F. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies in a Negotiated Set-
tlement of the U.S. Nationals’ Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 17 U. PA. J.
OF INT’LECON. L. 659 (1996)).
220. See id. at 31. For instance, Feinberg observes that a 71992 agreement
with Germany allowed claimants to elect either to accept payment of their
FCSC awards or to waive their right to payment in order to pursue claims for
their properties under German law.5 Id. (citing Final Report on the German
Democratic Republic Claims Program, FCSC, https://edit.justice.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/pages/attachments/2014/08/27/final_report_on_the_german_demo-
cratic_republic_claims_program.pdf; Agreement Between the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany Concerning the Settlement of Certain Property Claims, art. 3, FCSC
(1992), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attach-
ments/2014/08/26/jeremy.r.lafrancois_082614_111022.pdf).
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options.221 A key caveat is that implementation of alternatives,
intended to offer claimants better value than the lump-sum op-
tionb jo&HO 'e(&i'e 7im*o'tant QJanLes5 to 4^8^ Hajs anO 'egu-
lations,222 as well as the Cuban legal system.223 6Je 7men& oM
o*tions5 inQH&Oes< a %o&QJe'b o' Mo'm oM Oelt-equity swap;224 a
7'iLJt to o*e'ate;5225 a final project authorization;226 a 7*'eMe''eO
221. See id. at 31N32.
222. See ROY, supra note 41, at xi. Many have decried the 7draconian5 U.S.
laws and regulations, which severely restrict U.S. nationals’ investments in
Cuba. See id. The Helms-Burton Act, for instance, 7was clearly intended to
choke off the oxygen to Cuba—that is, foreign investment—at a time when Ha-
vana was reeling from the demise of the Soviet Union, and had decided as a
last resort to open the doors to entrepreneurs from around the world.5 Id.
223. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 32. Feinberg emphasizes that 7[t]o allay
concerns among U.S. investors,5 who in an informed market have borne wit-
ness to Cuba’s countless loan defaults over the last several decades, Cuba
would need to not only 7authorize legislation enabling these various types of
transactions,5 but also pass 7tailored resolutions5 at least purporting to 7guar-
antee5 these types of investments. See id.
224. See id. A claimant would hold a right to an equity investment (ranging
from partial ownership in a joint venture with a Cuban state enterprise part-
ner to 100 percent ownership) in a project, and then the voucher or coupon
could be 7applied to the equity investment, against future tax liabilities, or
possibly relief from certain performance requirements. . . . If used for tax lia-
bilities, the voucher could be registered with the Cuban government and be
marketable on a secondary market.5 Id.
225. See id. Such a right would give claimants an entrance ticket into Cuba’s
otherwise opaque, 7highly protected [market], such that firms that are allowed
entry often enjoy oligopolistic advantages in their market niches. The Cuban
government could ensure such market advantages for a fixed timeframe.5 Id.
226. See id. The authorization would be for a claimant’s 7proposed invest-
ment in the new Mariel development zone, which enjoys special tax ad-
vantages, and is generally oriented toward export markets. To date, the Cuban
government has approved only a few such projects,5 and this option might 7al-
low claimants to short-circuit the frustratingly lethargic project approval pro-
cess.5 Id.
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aQ(&isition5 'iLJt#227 sovereign bonds;228 and restoration of prop-
erties to former owners.229 Corporations pursuing these opt-out
alternatives would be given deadlines to negotiate their deals,
7*e'Ja*s one to tjo hea'sb5 jitJ tJe O&aH LoaH oM ens&'inL
7timeHh5 'esoH&tion anO ei*eOitinL tJe m&QJ-needed injection of
American capital.230 Wn *'aQtiQeb C&la jo&HO neeO to lotJ 7MaQiH`
itate5 tJe th*iQaHHh HonL anO a'O&o&s in%estment a**'o%aH *'o`
cess and allow for majority foreign (in this case American) own-
ership of the various investments and projects, or else claimants
would have little promise of a truly more valuable settlement
instrument.231
Feinberg departs from both the Creighton Report and the
Ashby Proposal by suggesting that a formal arbitral body, such
as the Tribunal proposed by Creighton University, is not only
unnecessary, but may in fact hinder the claims settlement pro-
cess.232 Both individual and corporate claimants should be free
to *'oQeeO 7inOi%iO&aHHh anO in isoHation5 in neLotiatinL tJei'
claims directly with the Cuban government.233 In the alterna-
ti%eb neLotiations 7Qo&HO be coordinated under an umbrella bilat-
227. See id. This right would permit the claimant to 7pass to the front of the
line in competitive bidding, for example for an attractive beachfront property,
the formation of a joint venture with a state enterprise, the provision of power
to the state energy grid, or entry into the telecom service sector.5 Id. Here, as
with the other options, the claimant would be 7obliged to inject new capital and
technology and its business plans would be subject to Cuban government ap-
proval.5 Id.
228. See id. at 32N33. These bonds would be issued by the Cuban, not U.S.,
government, and could be structured in a number of ways, including 710-year
bonds5 promising 7equal annual or semi-annual installments beginning the
sixth year, bearing a market-rate of interest.5 See id. at 32. In light of Cuba’s
myriad loan defaults over the last several decades, it bears repeating that Cuba
would need to reform its laws and pass new legislation, 7perhaps even tailored
resolutions guaranteeing the property rights of specific investments[,]5 if it
wants to inspire claimant/investor confidence in such alternative options. See
id.
229. See id. at 33. Feinberg quickly qualifies that this option exists 7only in
exceptional cases and where local conditions permit. Id. More likely, some
claimants might be offered substitute investment opportunities in vacant loca-
tions of comparable value. Pro-development conditions, requiring injections of
fresh capital and technology, would also apply.5 Id.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 34.
233. See id.
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e'aH QHaims 'esoH&tion Qommitteeobn5 jJiQJ jo&HO seek to MaQiHi`
tate l&siness OeaHsb l&t 7jo&HO not Ja%e a'lit'ation *oje's^5234
Zeinle'L insists tJat HeLaH ei*e'ts 7MamiHia' jitJ tJe W'an-
United States Claims Tribunal warn against the establishment
oM s&QJ a Mo'maH a'lit'aH meQJanism Mo' tJe C&la Qase^5235 The
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was initiated in 1981, yet it
stiHH 7O'aLs onb5 jitJmo&ntinL Qosts tieO to a'lit'ato's anO staMM
that Feinberg suggests Cuba cannot afford.236 Further, there is
concern about the claims settlement process deviating from its
intenOeO Qo&'se in a Mo'maH Mo'&mb HinLe'inL on 7Qontentio&s 'e`
*Hahs oM Jisto'iQaH L'ie%anQes5 anO 'eO&QinL a moment oM eQo`
nomic and diplomatic opportunity to political mudslinging.237 In
Zeinle'L’s %iejb a Hess Mo'maH &ml'eHHa QHaims Qommittee jo&HO
*'o%iOe m&QJ oM tJe 7&seM&H a'QJiteQt&'e5238 for speedily settling
claims, while avoiding the expense and dangerous tropes of a
formalized tribunal.239
Feinberg sets forth a sober, careful, and nuanced proposal, but
it suffers from similar flaws as those of the Creighton Report and
the Ashby Proposal. While acknowledging the very real claims
held (albeit neither filed with nor certified by the FCSC) by Cu-
ban American exiles, Feinberg declares early on that his policy
*a*e' 7MoQ&ses soHeHh &*on tJose QHaimants jJo je'e 4^8^ na`
tionaHs at tJe time oM tJe takinL^5240 The reasons for this are le-
gitimate, not least of which is the fact that under customary in-
ternational law and by U.S. legal practice, the U.S. government
7aO%oQates f3es*o&ses’d onHh Mo' QHaimants jJo je'e 4^8^ Qitigens
3at tJe time oM tJe takinLb’ tJat isb jJen tJe *'o*e'ties je'e Qon`
MisQateO^5241 By this well-settled rule, then, Cuban American ex-
iles are seemingly precluded from claims settlement negotia-
tions^ Zeinle'L QonQeOes tJat tJe massi%e 7*oHitiQaH QHo&t oM tJe
two million strong Cuban-Ame'iQan Oias*o'a5 Qo&HO *&sJ tJe
U.S. government to pursue their claims as well, but then he
234. See id.
235. Id.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id. A claims committee could adopt many of the aspects of a more
formal tribunal’s 7architecture,5 including expert-led negotiations, timeframe
prescriptions, bilateral representation, and 7transparency and consistency
across negotiations.5 See id.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 5.
241. Id.
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quickly retreats by suggesting that such a pursuit would be a
MooH’s e''anO in tJe MaQe oM a 'eQaHQit'ant C&lan Lo%e'nmentb
7HoatJ to aOmit anh j'onLOoinL in tJis 'eLa'O^ ^ ^ ^5242
Zeinle'L insists tJat anh 7Ha'Le-scale restoration of properties
[to their original exiled owners] . . . would be political suicide for
tJe inQ&mlent 'eLime in Xa%ana^5243 This implies the impracti-
cability of such a solution, but Feinberg too quickly suggests that
7aHte'nati%e QonQessions5 Qo&HOmeet Oias*o'ans’ MinanQiaH ei*eQ`
tations and psychological needs sufficient to 7o%e'Qome t'a&ma
anO aQJie%e nationaH 'eQonQiHiation^ ^ ^ ^5244 The Cuban American
exile community would lend more than token support, as their
support is the lynchpin to any effort to settle outstanding claims
and forge a path towards holistically renewed diplomatic and
economic relations.245 While Feinberg points to the fact that
many of the properties that might be sought by Cuban Ameri-
Qans a'e 7Jo&seJoHO 'esiOenQesb5246 he ignores the fact that Cu-
ban American exiles left behind more than just residential prop-
erties. Many of the properties were commercial, which now in-
clude state-owned lands. Even if the Cuban government refused
to return these lands outright to the original owners and their
successors and heirs, the Cuban government could instead elect
to issue investment credits towards the purchase of new proper-
ties.
242. See id.
243. Id.
244. See id.
245. See CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 4 (7While claims by [Cu-
ban American exiles] are not supported specifically by either domestic or inter-
national law, politically and economically their claims should not be ignored.
Politically, the exile community’s support among policy-makers in Washington
and activism against the Cuban regime make them a group that cannot be
ignored. Their influence in Washington brought about the Libertad Act (codi-
fying the U.S. embargo against Cuba), achieved special immigration status for
Cubans leaving the island, . . . and leveraged millions of dollars in federal
money to support democracy programming for Cuba. Economically, this group
will be among the first investors in an open Cuban market. . . . However, if the
property claims of the Cuban-American exile community are left unresolved,
their political and economic power could be turned against stabilizing a new
government in Cuba, much to the detriment not only of the island, but also to
potentially fruitful Cuba-U.S. relations. Thus, from the perspective of ele-
mental justice and reason, the positive aspects of including this group in a
broader property claims settlement policy far outweigh the general lack of do-
mestic or international legal justification for doing so.5) (emphasis added).
246. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 5.
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6Je Zeinle'L :'o*osaH aHso s&mma'iHh Oismisses C&la’s eQo`
nomiQ OamaLes QHaimsb jJiQJ a'e 7HikeHh to le 'eIeQteO lh tJe
4niteO 8tates Lo%e'nment^5247 According to Feinberg, Cuba
might have a better chance pursuing its personal injury claims,
jJiQJ 7mah Ja%e st'onLe' stanOinL^5248 Feinberg cites U.S. set-
tlements with Libya and Iraq as precedent.249 But ultimately,
the Feinberg Proposal fails to meaningfully consider not only the
actionable claims Cuba has against the United States, but the
claims that Cuban citizens have against their own government.
All of these interests must be considered in one complete pack-
age if both countries are to heal and set their sights on the more
positive, productive, and prosperous days ahead. The Cuban
Lo%e'nment Jas aH'eaOh stateO &ne(&i%oQaHHh tJat 7Qom*ensa`
tion to otJe C&lan *eo*Hen Mo' J&man anO eQonomiQ OamaLes5 is
a condition precedent to the resumption of normalized relations
between the United States and Cuba,250 and there is no reason
to suspect that Cuban citizens themselves would tolerate exclu-
sion from the negotiating table.
B. Cuban Approaches
6Je C&lan Lo%e'nment Jas ne%e' teQJniQaHHh 7'e*&OiateO5 tJe
U.S. claims certified by the FCSC.251 In fact, the Cuban govern-
ment Jas 'e*eateOHh inOiQateO tJat it 'eQoLniges 4^8^ nationaHs’
'iLJt to 7aOe(&ate anO I&st Qom*ensation5 Mo' tJe *'o*e'ties ei`
*'o*'iateO *&'s&ant to C&la’s nationaHigation Hajs^252 Pursuant
to customary international law and U.S. policy, however, the le-
gaHith oM 7ei*'o*'iation is QontinLent &*on aOe(&ateb eMMeQti%e
and prompt Qom*ensation^5253 6Je C&lan Lo%e'nment’s 'eQoLni`
tion oM QHaimants’ 'iLJts to QHaims settHements Qon%enientHh
247. See id. at 14.
248. Id.
249. See id.
250. See id. at 13 (citing Press Availability with Cuban Foreign Minister
Bruno Rodriguez, U.S. DEP’T STATE (July 20, 2015), https://www.state.gov/sec-
retary/remarks/2015/07/245094.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2017)
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170116033000/https://www.state.gov/secre-
tary/remarks/2015/07/245094.htm]).
251. See Ashby, supra note 20, at 418.
252. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 10.; see also Ashby, supra note 20, at
418 (7Cuba recognizes its obligation under international law to provide com-
pensation to U.S. nationals whose assets were taken.5).
253. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 8 (emphasis added).
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leaves out the third prong: speediness.254 Also, while the Cuban
Lo%e'nment Ooes 'eQoLnige QHaimants’ 'iLJt to Qom*ensationb it
recognizes neither the FCSC valuation nor the property claims
of Cuban American exiles, much less the claims of Cuban nation-
als.255
Despite its recognition of the validity oM 4^8^ nationaHs’ QHaimsb
the Cuban government simultaneously maintains a slew of
cross-claims stemming from alleged economic and personal in-
jury damages.256 As a baseline measure, the Cuban government
has consistently asserted over $100 billion USD in economic
claims related to the Embargo.257Regarding the alleged personal
injury damages, the Cuban government has asserted that the
4^8^ Lo%e'nment is 'es*onsilHe Mo' 73aQts oM te''o'ism aLainst
C&la’5 tJat Ja%e 'es&HteO in DbB?> OeatJs anO Eb\== OisalHinL
injuries.258 6Je C'eiLJton9e*o't s&LLests tJat leQa&se it is 7OiM`
ficult to distinguish between harm done by the embargo and that
254. See Ashby, supra note 20, at 420. Arguably, however, the U.S. govern-
ment is as much to blame for the lack of prompt compensation as the Cuban
government is. See id. As far back as 1964, Fidel Castro himself 7made a secret
offer to the U.S. government via the Swiss ambassador to pay $1 billion [USD]
in compensation for expropriated American properties and to release all polit-
ical prisoners in exchange for restoring the Cuban sugar quota.5 Id. Castro’s
offer (seeking to modify a significant term of the Embargo, which a cynic would
view as largely rhetorical) made it as far as the White House, which promptly
dismissed the offer 7without any acknowledgment to the Cuban government.5
See id. The offer may have even been seen as being made in good faith, as it
7followed both the failed Bay of Pigs Operation and the Cuban Missile Crisis. .
. .5 See id. The U.S. government’s 7internal position[,]5 however, 7was 3Castro
won’t last,’ and thus settling the claims would prevent the restitution of U.S.
assets when the Cuban government was [eventually] toppled.5 Id.No one, save
God, is omniscient, but the U.S. government could not have been more wrong,
as Castro maintained his grip on Cuba until his passing in November 2016.
See id.
255. See id. at 418.
256. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 13.
257. CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 5. For instance, a 1992 state-
ment detailed a variety of losses, including: $3.8 billion USD 7for losses in the
tourist industry5; $400 million USD 7for losses in the nickel industry5; $375
million USD 7for the higher costs of freighters5; $200 million USD 7for the pur-
chase of sugarcane crop equipment to substitute for U.S.-manufactured equip-
ment5; and $120 million USD 7for the substitution of electric industry equip-
ment. . . .5 FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 13. Indeed, in its 2015 annual report to
the United Nations General Assembly, Cuba maintained that 7accumulated
economic damages5 had reached the grand total of $121 billion USD. Id.
258. See id. (citing Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla, 7Necesidad de poner fin al
bloqueo económico, comercial y financiero impuesto por los Estados Unidos de
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done by the Cuban government, . . . it is impossible to verify the
QHaims anO QHaim amo&nts^5259 But the lack of clarity over who is
responsible did not prevent the Cuban government from pursu-
ing its claims, and a lawsuit moved forward in Cuban court in
1999.260 The U.S. government failed to appear, or even respond,
and the court awarded $181.1 billion USD in damages as com-
*ensation Mo' 7loth human losses and hardships flowing from
tJe emla'Lo^5261 ChniQaHHhb tJe C&lan Qo&'t e%en 7o'Oe'eO tJe
4^8^ to a*oHoLige^5262
The Cuban government has suggested that the question of
claims settlement and compensation has a simple answer. In an
unofficial statement, a senior Cuban diplomat has even told
9iQJa'O Zeinle'L tJat tJe 73Qom*ensation iss&e Qo&HO le OeQiOeO
easily and quickly: simply offset U.S. claims with Cuban coun-
ter-QHaims2 ;' eHse tJe iss&e Qan O'aL on Mo' hea's^ ^ ^ ^’5263 This
reductionist solution is mirrored in official Cuban statements,
jJiQJ insist tJat 73tJe totaH HiMtinL oM tJe lHoQkaOe is essentiaH to
move on towards the normalization of relations . . ., as well as
the compensation to [the Cuban] people for human and economic
damages^’5264 Both privately and publicly, the Cuban govern-
ment maintains tJis 7Het’s QaHH it a jasJ5 *ositionb one tJat
América contra Cuba, Sixty-Eighth Session of the U.N. G.A. (Oct. 29, 2013)).
These alleged acts purportedly include: CIA-sponsored hostilities, 7resulting in
549 deaths between 1959-1965 alone5; the Bay of Pigs invasion 7resulting in
176 deaths and over 300 wounded of which 50 were left incapacitated5; the
explosion of the French vessel La Coubre in Havana Harbor on March 4, 1960,
7resulting in 101 deaths including some French sailors5; the alleged terrorist
bombing of Cuban Airlines Flight 455 in 1976, 7killing all 73 persons on board
including 57 Cubans5; the September 11, 1980 assassination of Cuban diplo-
mat Félix Garcia Rodríguez; alleged aggressions relating to the Guantanamo
naval base; and even suspicions that 7the United States employed biological
warfare to spread fatal dengue fever in Cuba. . . .5 Id. at 13N14.
259. CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 5.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See id.
263. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 12 (quoting Author conversation with
Cuban diplomat, June 2015).
264. See id. at 13 (quoting Press Availability with Cuban Foreign Minister
Bruno Rodriguez, U.S. DEP’T STATE (July 20, 2015), https://www.state.gov/sec-
retary/remarks/2015/07/245094.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2017)
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170116033000/https://www.state.gov/secre-
tary/remarks/2015/07/245094.htm] (emphasis in the original)).
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should not be so easily disregarded, however dubious its credi-
bility.
The total value of FCSC-certified claims (approximately $1.9
billion USD), even with interest (approximately $7 billion USD),
is de minimis compared to the $181.1 billion USD damages
awarded by the Cuban court in 1999. As alluded to earlier, Rich-
ard Feinberg has suggested that the economic damages claims
'eHateO to tJe [mla'Lo a'e 7HikeHh to le 'eIeQteO5 lh tJe 4^8^
government for two reasons.265 First, the United States could in-
%oke tJe A'tiQHe //W 7seQ&'ith eiQe*tion5 oM tJe AL'eement oM tJe
Wo'HO 6'aOe;'Lanigationb jJiQJ aHHojsSemle' 8tates 7to *&'`
s&e 3essentiaH seQ&'ith inte'ests^’5266 Second, the U.S. govern-
ment is not HikeHh to Mo'sake its 7*'eMe''eO inst'&ment oM inte'`
nationaH Qoe'Qion5—economic sanctions—as 7so s&QQessM&HHh5
employed against Iran.267 Assuming consistency between the
1999 damages award (approximately $181 billion USD) and
C&la’s E\GA 'e*o't to tJe 4niteO Rations Yene'aH AssemlHh
(which cites $121 billion USD in economic damages), and assum-
ing further that the economic damages are not likely to be rec-
ognized by the United States, that still leaves approximately $60
billion USD in personal injury damages. If Richard Feinberg is
Qo''eQt tJat C&la 7mah Ja%e st'onLe' stanOinL5 jitJ 'es*eQt to
these claims,268C&la’s totaH estimateO OamaLes stiHH o%e'sJaOoj
the FCSC-certified claims more than eight times over. Thus,
while the C&lan Lo%e'nment’s 7Het’s QaHH it a jasJ5 *osition is
admittedly untenable (and perhaps even mere diplomatic pos-
turing, as alluded to in the Introduction), the U.S. government
cannot simply disregard Cuban claims outright. Any settlement
negotiations must include meaningfully bilateral participation
anO QonsiOe'ation oM eaQJ 7siOe’s5 QHaims^
C. Foreign Approaches
By contrast, the Cuban government has settled claims with
the nationals of at least the following five other countries: Swit-
zerland (1967), Spain (1967), France (1967), Great Britain
265. See id. at 14.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See id.
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(1978), and Canada (1980).269 Cynics argue that these settle-
ments serve as poor precedent and are largely irrelevant for pur-
poses of considering the outstanding claims of U.S. nationals,
primarily because the value of FCSC-Qe'tiMieO QHaims 7Oja'Ms5
the total combined value of these five settlements, which
7Ooesn’t e%en amo&nt to A- oM tJe %aH&e oM 4^8^ QHaims^5270 To
dismiss their precedential value, however, is to ignore the only
on-point precedent that exists.271 These five settlements repre-
269. See id. at 11 (citing Michael W. Gordon, The Settlement of Claims for
Expropriated Foreign Private Property between Cuba and Foreign Nations
Other than the United States, 5 LAWYER OF THE AM. 457 (1973)).
270. Ana Radelat, Settlement of U.S. Claims Against Cuba Unlikely as Long
as Fidel Stays in Power, 13 CUBANEWS 1, 1 (2005).
271. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 34 (suggesting that the establishment
of such a formal arbitral mechanism as the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal is ill-
suited to the American-Cuban settlement because, inter alia, the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal had the 7critical advantage5 of a $1 billion USD initial award
and an 7unending stream5 of Iranian petroleum revenues—5conditions not pre-
sent in the Cuba case5). When analyzing prospects and potential frameworks
for an American-Cuban settlement, many scholars rely on examples of other
international tribunals (e.g., the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal; the Eritrea-Ethi-
opia Claims Commission; and the U.N. Claims Commission) and claims com-
missions or tribunals in Latin America (e.g., the Nicaraguan Mixed Claims
Commission) and Eastern Europe (e.g., Czech Republic; Slovakia; Hungary;
Poland; Bulgaria; and Romania), comparing and contrasting to account for in-
herent differences between the history, economy, politics, and social structure
of the chosen example’s plaintiff and defendant governments and the United
States and Cuba, respectively. See, e.g., Ashby, supra note 20, at 426 (compar-
ing and contrasting the Tribunal proposed by the Creighton Report to the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal); CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 35N104 (com-
paring and contrasting the Tribunal and Claims Court proposed by the
Creighton Report to other historical examples of claims tribunals and settle-
ment options). While historical examples of settlement tribunals and commis-
sions not directly involving Cuba are relevant, it is this author’s view that,
because the settlements Cuba has reached with other countries stem from the
same set of historical facts (the Cuban Revolution) and involve largely similar
actors (individuals and corporations whose properties and investments were
lost pursuant to the Castro nationalizations), these settlements serve as a bet-
ter lens through which to evaluate the terms and conditions the Cuban gov-
ernment may be willing to consider in resolving the claims of all groups in-
volved in any prospective American-Cuban settlement. SeeMichaelW. Gordon,
The Settlement of Claims for Expropriated Foreign Private Property between
Cuba and Foreign Nations Other than the United States, 5 LAWYER OF THEAM.
457, 467 (1973) (noting that the information available regarding the Cuban
government’s settlement of claims with other countries 7may be of substantial
use both in identifying the type of agreement that Cuba is willing to consider
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sent the closest approximation of terms and conditions the Cu-
ban government might be willing to accept in future negotiations
with the United States, and as such, they serve as the go-to evi-
dence when modeling any prospective American-Cuban settle-
ment.272
The Swiss, Spanish, and French settlement agreements were
aHH siLneO in G=@?b aHH 7jitJin Mo&'teen Oahs oM one anotJe'^5273
The Swiss accord, signed March 2, 1967, did not resolve the
claims of all Swiss nationals.274 Rather, the settlement resolved
only the claims of three Swiss-owned Cuban food processing en-
te'*'isesb 7aHH oM jJiQJ je'e nationaHigeO lh C&lan Haj >=\ on
;Qtole' GDb G=@\^5275 The Cuban government agreed to a settle-
ment of 18,039,000 Swiss francs, to be paid out over an eight-
year payment schedule, with 1,752,360 Swiss francs due each of
the first three years and 2,555,525 Swiss francs due each of the
remaining five years.276 Converted to U.S. dollars, the total
value of the Swiss-Cuban settlement was $4,140,000 USD.277 As
with the other four agreements discussed in this section, no in-
formation was officially released regarding the total value of the
8jiss inte'ests’ QHaims^ As s&QJb it is im*ossilHe 7to Oete'mine
the relative percentages which the agreed upon payments rep-
resent in propo'tion to tJe totaH QHaims oM tJe nationaHs5 oM 8jit`
zerland and each other country.278
The agreed-upon Swiss-Cuban settlement would serve as in-
OemniMiQation onHh Mo' tJe nationaHigation 7oM tJe ente'*'ises
and to illustrate those conditions which the Cubans deem mandatory for any
settlement.5). In addition, the Cuban government’s underlying motivation for
resolving claims with other countries, i.e., seeking and securing commercial
concessions, is likely to be the determinative factor motivating Cuba’s resolu-
tion of claims in any American-Cuban settlement. See FEINBERG, supra note
17, at 11N12 (7[T]he Cuban government recognizes that unresolved U.S. prop-
erty claims . . . raise a significant barrier to new capital inflows. . . . In so far
as Cuba wishes to restore normal commercial relations with the very large
market immediately to its north, the outstanding property claims remain a
significant barrier, legally, politically, and commercially.5).
272. See infra Part III.
273. Gordon, supra note 271, at 459.
274. Id. at 459N60, 463.
275. Id. at 460.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 465, 470, n. 42. This figure is based upon prevailing exchange rates
as of March 1967. Id.
278. Id. at 460. See also FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 11, n. 19.
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themselves, the payment of fees due to the entities prior to na-
tionalization and for the use of brand names by the Cuban gov-
e'nment MoHHojinL tJe nationaHigations^5279 Again, no other
8jiss nationaHs’ QHaims je'e inOemniMieOb jJetJe' inOi%iO&aH o'
corporate. In exchange, the Swiss government and the Swiss in-
terests representing the former owners of the Cuban food pro-
QessinL ente'*'ises estalHisJeO 7a ma'ket Mo' B\b\\\ tons oM C&`
lan s&La' ann&aHHh Mo' eiLJt hea'sb5 to le *&'QJaseO at tJen-
prevailing global market prices for sugar.280
The Cuban government was only able to negotiate a quid-pro-
(&o aL'eement leQa&se oM C&la’s HaQk oM Mo'eiLn Q&''enQhb jJiQJ
7*'eQH&OeO tJe *ossiliHith oM Qom*ensation lh Oi'eQt QasJ *ah`
ments^5281 Furthermore, the Cuban government refused to apply
all of the proceeds from sugar sales to the annual indemnifica-
tion payments.282 ZoHHojinL 7jJat tJe 8jiss Lo%e'nment Oe`
sQ'ileO as 3litte' OisQ&ssionsobn’5 onHh a**'oiimateHh one-third of
the hard currency Cuba received served as an indemnity, with
the Cuban government simply pocketing the rest.283 This
7&ni(&e5 a''anLement is 7*a'tiaHHh att'il&talHe to tJe MooO *'o`
cessing nature of the expropriated Swiss ojneO Qom*anies5 anO
their ability to create and benefit from a market for Cuban
sugar.284 At least one scholar has argued that the Swiss govern-
ment anO inte'ests’ 7jiHHinLness anO aliHith5 to aQQe*t s&La' 7'e`
s&HteO in tJei' 'eQei%inL a L'eat *e'QentaLe5 mo'e oM tJei' totaH
QHaims tJan 7JaO tJehb Hike tJe inOi%iO&aH QHaimantsb leen inte'`
ested soHeHh in 'eQei%inL QasJ inOemniMiQation^5285 There is, how-
ever, a greater lesson to be gleaned. The settlement of outstand-
ing claims is neither a virtue unto itself, nor is it the Cuban gov-
e'nment’s *'ima'h olIeQt in anh neLotiation^ 9atJe'b seekinL
and obtaininL 7Qomme'QiaH5 anO 7Mo'eiLn eiQJanLe5 QonsiOe'a`
tions is tJe C&lan Lo%e'nment’s main im*e'ati%e^286
279. Gordon, supra note 271, at 460.
280. See id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 460N61.
284. Id. at 461.
285. Id. at 462.
286. See id. at 466 (7The actual increased trade with France and Spain, as
well as the direct trade provisions in the Swiss accord, additionally illustrate
that Cuba has not agreed to any settlement of claims merely to resolve legiti-
mate claims for property deprivations, but that the settlements are considered
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The Spanish settlement was executed on March 14, 1967, but
pursuant to a non-disclosure agreement, no details were made
public.287 Scholars have suggested that the existence of a non-
OisQHos&'e aL'eement 7mah [serve as] evidence that Cuba had to
settle for a larger payment than it wished to have disclosed to
tJe *&lHiQ^5288 In recent years, however, some new information
has come to light. At least one source has 7'e%eaHeO tJat 8*anisJ
QHaims je'e settHeO Mo' a'o&nO .B\ miHHion o48rbn5 jJiHe tJe to`
taH %aH&e oM 8*anisJ QHaims 7jas estimateO at alo&t .DA\miHHion
o48rn^5289 If this source is correct, the Spanish-Cuban settle-
ment represents a mere fraction (just over 10 percent) of the
value of pre-settlement claims. Still, such an analysis obscures
a more relevant clue that should not be understated. As of 1967,
the Cuban government was (and perhaps remains) willing to ne-
gotiate multi-million-dollar settlements for claims of foreign na-
tionals whose properties were nationalized.
Unfortunately, little else is known about the terms and condi-
tions of the Spanish-Cuban settlement. Without such infor-
mation, it is difficult to predict what terms the Cuban govern-
ment may deem acceptable in any negotiation with the United
States. But the fact that Cuba may have entered into a multi-
million-dollar settlement with Spain as far back as the late six-
ties provides new hope to U.S. nationals seeking resolution of
their own claims, albeit jitJ one Qa%eat^ C&la OiO not 7M&HMiHH its
*ahment olHiLations &nOe' tJe aL'eement &ntiH G==Bobn5290which
suggests that even if the Cuban government enters into a mutu-
ally-acceptable agreement with the United States and its claim-
ants, it could take years, even decades, for Cuba to satisfy the
settlements.291
as a quid pro quo for the acquisition of needed commodities or foreign ex-
change.5).
287. Id. at 459.
288. Id. See also CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 102 (7One source
speculates Cuba wanted to keep the agreement terms confidential because the
settlement amount was larger than Cuban negotiators had hoped or antici-
pated.5).
289. Id.
290. Id. (citing Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Some Legal and Practical Issues in
the Resolution of Cuban Nationals’ Expropriations Claims Against Cuba, 16 U.
PA. J. INT’LBUS. L. 217, n. 15 (1995)).
291. See id. Because there is no available information about the payment
schedule Spain negotiated with Cuba, it is impossible to verify whether the
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The French-Cuban accord, the final 1960s settlement, was ex-
ecuted in Havana onMarch 16, 1967.292 Unlike the Swiss-Cuban
agreement, the French-Cuban accord universally indemnified
all French claimants and contained no direct trade agreement.293
WJe'eas tJe QHaims &nOe' tJe 8jiss aQQo'O je'e 7s&lIeQteO to a
m&t&aH Oete'mination oM tJe %aHiOith5 oM tJe 8jiss inte'ests’
claims,294 the French-Cuban accord was entered into pursuant
to anO onHh 73aMte' a liHate'aH eiamination of the claims raised
lh Z'enQJ *e'sonsb nat&'aH anO I&'iOiQaH^’5295 Thus, while the
Z'enQJ nationaHs’ QHaims je'e s&lIeQteO to Hess se%e'e C&lan
scrutiny and contestation, the Cuban government nevertheless
played a role in determining the appropriate and acceptable val-
ues of the claims.296
The Cuban government agreed to a settlement of 10,861,532
francs, to be paid in twelve nearly equal installments over a pe-
riod of approximately five years.297 This equates to roughly
$2,170,000 USD.298 Because the French-Cuban accord contained
no direct trade provision, the Cuban government was obligated
to and did satisfy the settlement, through a series of direct trans-
fers (cash payments) from the Banco Nacional de Cuba 7to tJe
Cuban government either met or failed to meet its obligations under the Span-
ish-Cuban settlement. See id. Compared to the Swiss-Cuban settlement, which
called for an eight-year payment schedule, it appears that even when Cuba
agrees to potentially more favorable settlement sums, the Cuban government
may try to extend and prolong (to the extent it is permitted pursuant to the
subject settlement agreement) satisfaction of settlement. See id. That said, the
Department Politique Féderal, Bern, Switzerland reported that compensation
payments pursuant to the Swiss accord were made with 73exemplary punctual-
ity[,]’5 which provides additional hope for more favorable outcomes. See Gor-
don, supra note 271, at 460, 469, n. 22.
292. Id. at 463.
293. Id. at 463N64.
294. Id. at 463.
295. Id. at 464, n. 41 quoting French Accord at preamble.
296. Id. at 463N66 (7Such a provision should not be unexpected; no nation
agreeing to the payment of a settlement amount for the taking of foreign prop-
erty is likely to accept the unilateral declaration of the claimant nation as to
the amount of claims owed. In any future agreement between Cuba and the
United States, Cuba is unlikely to unquestionably accept as conclusively de-
terminative of the value of the property expropriated, the approximately $1.8
billion [USD] of United States claims adjudicated by the [FCSC].5).
297. Id. at 465.
298. Id. at 465, 470, n. 42 (this figure is based upon prevailing exchange rates
as of March 1967).
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credit of a special account opened in the !ank oM Z'anQe^5299 In
eiQJanLeb anO 7not &nei*eQteO in tJis Mo'm oM aL'eementb5 tJe
French-C&lan aQQo'O *'o%iOeO Mo' tJe 7M&HH 'eHease5 oM C&la
&*on Qom*Hete *ahmentb a 7L&a'antee5 lh tJe Z'enQJ Lo%e'n`
ment against any future related claims pursued by French na-
tionaHsb a 7L'ant5 to Z'anQe oM eiQH&si%e I&'isOiQtion Mo' Oist'il&`
tion oM settHement *'oQeeOsb 7M'ee eiQJanLe5 oM anh]aHH inMo'`
mation necessary to effect the settlement, and the settlement of
'eHateO 7OisaL'eements5 onHh lhm&t&aH neLotiations^300
While at first glance the absence of a direct trade provision is
notable, it appears that, as with the Swiss (and likely the Span-
ish) accord, here too the Cuban government was motivated by a
quid-pro-quo arrangement. In the years preceding execution of
the French-Cuban settlement agreement, Cuban trade with
Z'anQe steaOiHh O'o**eO 7M'om EG^A miHHion pesos in G=@\5 to a
low of 2.9 million pesos in 1962.301 Trade steadily surged back,
with an increase to 29.6 million pesos in 1965, followed by a brief
dip to 22.3 million pesos in 1966.302 Then, in the same year the
French-Cuban accord was signed, Cuban trade with France
7mo'e tJan Oo&lHeO o%e' tJe *'e%io&s hea'b 'eaQJinL A@^GmiHHion
pesos^5303 There is little doubt that any settlement negotiated
with Cuba is driven prima'iHh lh tJe C&lan Lo%e'nment’s t'i`
partite goal (which held true both then and now). This goal is to
'eestalHisJ ma'ketsb 7Oi%e'siMh its t'aOe in tJe non-socialist
jo'HOb5 anO Hessen tJe nation’s Oe*enOenQe on otJe' Qo&nt'ies^304
299. Id. at 465.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 464.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 457 (7[T]he settlements have allowed Cuba to diversify its trade
in the non-socialist world and to a very small degree lessen the nation’s de-
pendence on the Soviet Union.5). Whereas in 1967 Cuba sought to lessen its
dependence on the Soviet Union, today Cuba hopes to lessen its dependence on
Venezuela. See FEINBERG, supra note 3, at 50N52 (7Having suffered severely
from the loss of one energy patron, [the Soviet Union,] the Cubans do not want
to be shocked a second time. In 2012 Cuba sought to lessen its dependency on
imported oil [from Venezuela] by exploiting what appeared to be promising off-
shore oil reserves, but drilling platforms failed to discover commercially viable
deposits. . . . Even if Venezuela were a healthier economy, it could be a piece,
but only a piece, of Cuba’s emerging market strategy.5).
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Entering the 1970s, the Cuban government negotiated settle-
ments with both Great Britain and Canada.305 As early as 1973,
the Cuban government commenced settlement discussions with
CanaOab l&t neLotiations je'e OeHaheOb *e'Ja*s 7leQa&se Cana`
dian trade with Cuba did not decrease significantly after the rev-
olution, and therefore Cuba did not have an incentive to negoti-
ate an immeOiate settHement to maintain t'aOe He%eHs^5306 Cuba
would reach a final resolution with Great Britain first, with the
final agreement executed on October 18, 1978.307 Much like the
settlement with Spain, no details were publicly disseminated,
leaving scholars to speculate that the Cuban government may
have negotiated a similar non-disclosure agreement in an effort
to mask a settlement amount or terms that it found to be less-
than-favorable.308
Following nearly seven years of negotiations, an agreement
was finally reached with Canada on November 7, 1980.309 The
Canadian-C&lan aL'eement QaHHeO Mo' C&la 7to *ah oCArn
$850,000 as a global indemnity (with an initial installment fol-
lowed by four semi-annual payments) to be distributed by the
Yo%e'nment oM CanaOa to its QHaimants^5310 Little else is known
about the terms and conditions of the settlement, but it appears
that as with the French accord, a direct trade provision was not
an element.311WJat is knojn is tJat 7CanaOa’s totaH in%estment
305. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 11. See also Gordon, supra note 271;
and Richard B. Lillich & Burns H. Weston, Lump Sum Agreements: Their Con-
tinuing Contribution to the Law of International Claims, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 69,
app. at 78N79 (1988).
306. CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 101.
307. See Lillich & Weston, supra note 305, app. at 79.
308. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 11. The lack of public dissemination of
information is matched by the veritable absence of scholarly discussion, or even
mention, of the British-Cuban settlement. Of the three-major works cited here
(the Creighton Report, the Ashby Proposal, and the Feinberg Proposal), only
one contains a reference to the British-Cuban settlement (the Feinberg Pro-
posal). See id. at 11 (mentioning that a 7bilateral settlement of outstanding
property claims5 was negotiated with Great Britain in 1980). This author was
only able to find one other mention of the British-Cuban settlement, sans dis-
cussion, in a journal article appendix, which chronologically lists various
agreements from 1969N1987. See also Lillich & Weston, supra note 305, app.
at 79.
309. Id.
310. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 11N12.
311. SeeCREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 101. Relative to the United
States, Switzerland, and France, Canada had a 7relatively small amount of
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in C&lajas estimateO at onHh oCArn .=^BmiHHion in G=A@obn5 anO
tJat tjo 7CanaOian lanks ojneO oCArn .>^>miHHion oM tJat totaH
in%estment %aH&eobn5 tJe !ank oM Ro%a 8Qotia anO tJe 9ohaH
Bank of Canada.312 Both banks negotiated separate and individ-
&aH settHementsjitJ tJe C&lan Lo%e'nment 7nea' tJe time tJei'
properties were confiscated and before the Canadian govern-
ment neLotiateO anh H&m* s&m settHement^5313 Assuming that
the settlement reached in 1980 was to resolve the total Canadian
investment in Cuba (CAD $9.4 million in 1956 dollars) minus
tJe tjo CanaOian lanks’ in%estments fCAr .>^>miHHiondb 'o&LJ
arithmetic suggests that the total value of all remaining out-
standing Canadian claims was only CAD $600,000, which, ad-
justed for inflation, might more or less equal the CAD $850,000
global indemnity (in 1980 dollars) actually paid. That the Cuban
government may have agreed to a 1:1 ratio of claim value to set-
tlement value bodes well for future claimants, countenanced by
the fact that the total claim value (CAD $850,000) was de mini-
mis compared to the total value of FCSC-certified claims ($1.8
liHHion 48rd^ Xe'e toob tJe C&lan Lo%e'nment’s *'ima'h anO &H`
timate motivation was still quid-pro-quo, as Canada would be-
Qome one oM C&la’s main Qomme'QiaH *a'tne's^314
III. SOLUTION: ESTABLISHING AN INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR
CLAIMS RESOLUTION
This Part will unpack the major flaws that co-exist in the three
sets of approaches examined in Part II (American, Cuban, and
Foreign). It will then set forth a concise three-tier framework
through which outstanding claims of all parties (U.S. nationals,
Cuban American exiles, and Cuban nationals) may be resolved.
investment in Cuba, which increased the feasibility of settlement with Canada
as opposed to nations with greater investment levels.5 Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See FEINBERG, supra note 3, at 45N48 (7In the 1990s, following the trau-
matic disappearance of COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance)
and its Eastern European economic partners, Cuba turned first to western Eu-
rope and Canada to provide commerce and, most important, for direct invest-
ments that would bring capital, know-how, and access to international mar-
kets.5).
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A. Previous Proposals Are Flawed
The Creighton Report, Ashby Proposal, and Feinberg Proposal
together represent the most complete and up-to-date examina-
tion oM QHaims stemminL M'om Cast'o’s nationaHigation oM *'o*e'`
ties following the Cuban Revolution. These proposals, however,
suffer from several flaws that undermine the practicability of
the solutions proposed therein. This section will explore three
major flaws that thwart the major proposals to date, i.e., the is-
s&es oM 7inQH&si%ith5 f*'o*osaHs tJat eitJe' inQH&Oe o' eiQH&Oe se`
lect groups of parties with outstanding claims), ex parte valua-
tions (the FCSC-Qe'tiMieO QHaims je'e %aH&eO jitJo&t C&la’s
participation or input), and official U.S. policy prescriptions
(that encourage domination of the Cuban economic and political
s*Je'esb 'atJe' tJan 'es*eQt Mo' C&la’s so%ereignty).
1. Inclusivity
The first major flaw of existing proposals is that they are all,
for the most part, under-inclusive. As the Creighton Report cor-
'eQtHh olse'%esb tJe'e a'e tJ'ee L'o&*s o' 7QHasses5 oM QHaimantsb
including U.S. nationals, Cuban American exiles, and Cuban na-
tionals.315 The Creighton Report acknowledges the political clout
of the Cuban American community, but nevertheless finds that
their claims are likely excludable because they do not fall within
the definition of 7U.S. national5 contemplated by the Cuban
Claims Program.316 The Creighton Report also recognizes the va-
lidity of Cuban nationals’ claims, but ultimately finds that there
is 7no inte'nationaH Oimension5 to tJei' QHaimsb anO so tJeh
should seek to adjudicate their claims before a 7C&lan 8*eQiaH
CHaims Co&'t^5317 The Creighton Report expertly examines all
three groups, but also insinuates that the only claims capable of
resolution on an international level are those of U.S. nationals,
to le settHeO leMo'e a sinLHe 7C&la-U.S. Claims T'il&naH^5318
Similarly, the Ashby Proposal is devoid of any meaningful con-
sideration of Cuban American exiles’ or Cuban nationals’
315. See CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 3N5.
316. See id. at 3N4 (Because Cuban American exiles were not U.S. nationals
7at the time of the expropriation of their property[,]5 they could not take part
in the certification process, and 7thus are not protected under U.S. law to the
same extent as U.S. national claimants.5). See also discussion, supra note 56.
317. See CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 4N6.
318. See id. at 3, 5.
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claims.319 The Feinberg Proposal does a better job of carefully
considering the legitimate claims of Cuban Americans, but ulti-
mateHh o*ts to MoQ&s soHeHh on 7tJose QHaimants jJo je'e 4^8^
nationaHs at tJe time oM tJe takinL^5320 Surprisingly, the Fein-
berg Proposal does not address the claims of Cuban nationals at
all.321 Likewise, the Cuban approaches dismiss the claims of Cu-
ban Americans and cast serious doubt over the Cuban govern-
ment’s jiHHinLness to M&HHh 'eQoLnige tJe QHaims oM aHH 4^8^ na`
tionals.322
The problematic nature of under-inclusivity cannot be over-
stated. The competing interests of these various groups must be
coextensively reconciled. An analysis of these groups’ positions,
under the Putnam Theory,323 suggests that the competing inter-
ests of parties within two intersecting group-sets, Cuban Amer-
icans versus Cuban nationals and the U.S. government versus
the Cuban government, are likely to undermine any future
HeaOe'’s attem*t to 'eaQJ a He%eH two OomestiQ 7jin set^5324 If the
U.S. government seeks to exclude Cuban nationals, the Cuban
government will not have the support of its domestic Cuban na-
tional constituency. If the Cuban government seeks to exclude
Cuban American nationals, the U.S. government will not have
tJe s&**o't oM its OomestiQ Qonstit&enQh^ 6Jis is QaHHeO a 7Hose-
Hose^5
On the surface at least, the solution is obvious, however diffi-
cult it may be to implement. The claims of all interested parties
must be simultaneously considered in one grand bargain. Cuban
Americans may not have been U.S. nationals for purposes of the
Cuban Claims Program, but Cuban Americans were victims of
innumerable violations of their human rights,325 not least of
319. See generally Ashby, supra note 20. See also id. at 427 (devoting two
sentences to 7Cuban counterclaims.5).
320. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 5. In fairness, Feinberg does note that
Cuban American claims, and the 7financial demands and psychological needs5
of their claimants, will be addressed and 7spelled out in a sequel study.5 See
id.
321. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 5 (7This paper . . . focuses solely upon
those claimants who were U.S. nationals at the time of the taking.5).
322. See supra Part II.
323. See supra text accompanying note 101.
324. See id.
325. SeeDavid P. Fidler, LIBERTAD v. Liberalism: An Analysis of the Helms-
Burton Act from within Liberal International Relations Theory, 4 IND. J. GLOB.
LEGAL STUD. 297, 335N36 (1997).
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which is the right against discriminatory confiscation of private
property (whether real or personal) on the basis of political opin-
ion.326 The same holds true for Cuban nationals (and their heirs)
jJose *'o*e'ties je'e aHHeLeOHh 7nationaHigeOb5 manh oM jJom
are yet to be compensated.327 Under both customary interna-
tional law and U.S. practice, nationalization of property is legal
onHh iM MoHHojeO lh 73aOe(&ateb eMMeQti%e anO *'om*t Qom*ensa`
tion^’5328 Otherwise, the so-QaHHeO 7nationaHigation5 amounts to
iHHeLaH 7QonMisQation^5 6Je'eMo'eb aHtJo&LJ C&lan Ame'iQan ei`
iles were not nationals at the time of the confiscations (confisca-
tions only because the Cuban government has yet to compensate
them for their losses), they are equally entitled to have their
claims heard. Cuban nationals too deserve a seat at the negoti-
ating table. Any proposed settlement may not be under-inclu-
sive, and so the claims of all three groups (U.S. nationals, Cuban
American exiles, and Cuban nationals) must be equally heard,
considered, and settled.
2. Ex Parte Valuations
The second major flaw of existing proposals is that they either
enshrine or ignore the FCSC-certified claims valuations. The
Cuban government is unlikely to accept the FCSC-certified val-
uations at face value. Put another way, the Cuban government
is likely to challenge the FCSC-certified valuations, and under
customary international law, the Cuban government has every
right to challenge such valuations.329
The Cuban government is equally entitled to due process of
law, and to declare that the FCSC-certified claim valuations are
uncontestable flies in the face of customary international law
and U.S. practice.330 The U.S. position, and often the position of
the major American settlement proposals to date,331 is that Cuba
7ojes5 tJe 4niteO 8tates tJe M&HH *'inQi*aH %aH&e oM tJe ZC8C-
certified claims (approximately $1.8 billion USD) plus interest
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 7N8 (quoting Foreign Relations of the
United States 1940, Vol. V, Notes from Secretary of State Hull to the Mexican
Ambassador (1938), 1009N10).
329. See Fidler, supra note 325, at 349.
330. Id.
331. See supra Part II.
600 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 43:2
(approximately $7 billion USD).332 This blanket assertion does
not comport with customary international law or state practice
as of the last several centuries.
A QHaimant state 73mah not Oe*'i%e a Mo'eiLn nationaH oM tJe
right in accordance with due process of law to effectively contest
the bases and the quantum of claims that may affect his prop-
e'th^’5333 Further, as the Feinberg Proposal helpfully notes, the
ZC8C *'oQeO&'es je'e 7ex parte and non-adversarial: the de-
fendant (the Cuban government in this case) was not present
and had no opportunity to question the assertions of the claim-
ant, to examine and challenge the evidence presented by the
claimant or its legal representatives, nor to present contradic-
to'h e%iOenQe^5334 As such, the Cuban government was unilater-
ally deprived of due process of law, as the FCSC did not have
access to Cuban property registries, nor was it capable of con-
ducting on-site visits.335 Further, the FCSC has no external ap-
peals process, whether to a superior U.S. court or to an interna-
tional tribunal.336 The Cuban government, under FCSC proce-
dures, had no representation and no legal recourse.
In addition, there is no one best method to arrive at a valua-
tion. As the Feinberg Proposal lays bare, the commonly-accepted
methods of claims valuation widely vary.337 If the Cuban govern-
ment is to be expected to negotiate and resolve the outstanding
claims in good faith, it must be guaranteed the full panoply of
due process of law, which includes participation in selecting the
method of valuation. As one attorney who represented the ITT
Corporation before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has observed,
mutual agreement over claims valuation methods and results is
332. See Neyfakh, supra note 22.
333. See Fidler, supra note 325, at 349, n. 246 quoting Freedom of Trade and
Investment in the Hemisphere, CJI/SO/II doc 67/96 rev. 5 (Aug. 23, 1996) (Opin-
ion of the Inter-American Juridical Committee in Response to Resolution
AG/DOC 3375/96 of the General Assembly of the Organization [of American
States]).
334. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 21.
335. See id.
336. See id.
337. See id. at 22N24.
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critical to establishing a foundation of legitimacy for any inter-
national claims settlement, and at the very least, facilitates and
expedites the process.338
3. Official U.S. Policy Prescriptions
The third major flaw of existing proposals is that they assume
that to-date official U.S. policy prescriptions will continue to pre-
dominate. There is no question that the Helms-Burton Act, the
codification of the U.S. Embargo against Cuba, enjoys wide sup-
port throughout the American electorate.339 The underlying pur-
pose of the Helms-Burton Act is to push for a regime change in
Cuba, to liberalize and democratize a Cuba that has known only
7Fidelismo5 Mo' nea'Hh siith hea's^340 Despite recent changes an-
nounced under the Obama Administration,341 this remains the
official policy of the United States towards Cuba in both official
policy and practice.342 This position is flawed, because it priori-
tizes domination over respect for sovereignty, and United States
obstinance on the issue undermines prospects for successful
claims resolutions.343
338. Telephone interview with Anonymous (Dec. 4, 2016) (notes on file with
author). Anonymous is a former attorney for ITT Corporation (ITT), who rep-
resented IKO Kabel, a wholly owned subsidiary of ITT, before the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal. This attorney has expressed their desire to retain full ano-
nymity.
339. See Saturnino E. Lucio, II, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Libertad) Act of 1996: An Initial Analysis, 27 U.MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 325,
326 (1995/1996) (7Whether one agrees or disagrees with the purpose, provi-
sions, or probable consequences of the newly-enacted [Helms-Burton Act] is
beside the point. On March 12, 1996, President Clinton signed the [Helms-
Burton Act] into law, having previously been approved by the U.S. Congress
by wide margins. The substantial support for the [Helms-Burton Act] makes it
highly unlikely that U.S. policy towards Cuba will change in the foreseeable
future absent some significant political changes in the Cuban government.5)
(emphasis added).
340. See id.
341. See Charting a New Course in Cuba, supra note 24.
342. See FEINBERG, supra note 3, at 1N22.
343. See Castro Mariño, supra note 108, at 60 (noting that the Helms-Burton
Act 7dictated the terms under which any future Cuban government was to be
recognized by the U.S. government and made bilateral relations dependent on
the resolution of property claims under U.S. law.5). See also discussion supra
note 108.
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It is about time that the United States move away from the
7neoQoHoniaH5 moOeH im*oseO on C&lab344 the modern day mani-
festation of the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary.345
As one scholar has noteOb 9aFH Cast'o’s s&QQesso'b reag-Canel,
is unlikely to cave to U.S. pressure to liberalize and democratize,
l&t is HikeHh to 7Qontin&e to OeMh *ost-Cold War American fanta-
sies even as it moves further away from its orthodox socialist
*ast^5346 Given the overlapping of U.S. nationals and Cuban
American exiles (many of whom are by now also U.S. nationals),
the U.S. government owes it to its people to refresh and modern-
ize its thinking, approach, policy, and practice towards Cuba.
Cuba is not a pawn to be played with.
Further, the United States has been broadcasting an un-
founded message for decades, that Cuba, and Cuba alone, is re-
sponsible for the fact that FCSC-certified (and other) claims re-
main outstanding. Both the Helms-Burton Act and the
Creighton Report em*Hoh tJe te'm 7QonMisQate5 'atJe' tJan 7na`
tionaHigeb5 s&LLestinL tJat C&la Jas iHHeLaHHh 7QonMisQateO5 tJe
properties and assets of U.S. nationals by virtue of the fact that
the claims remain outstanding.347 Arguably, however, the
United States is (at least partially) responsible for the delay in
claims resolution.348 As early as 1964, Cuba expressed its inter-
est in 'esoH%inL QHaimsb jJen ZiOeH Cast'o maOe a 7seQ'et5 oMMe'
tJ'o&LJ tJe 8jiss amlassaOo' 7to *ah .G liHHion o48rn in Qom`
pensation for expropriated American properties and to release
all political prisoners in exchange for restoring the Cuban sugar
(&ota^5349 Tate' on in G=?Ab C&la’s Zi'st re*&th :'imeSiniste'
maOe a 7Qon%inQinL a'L&ment5 to a jeHH-known American jour-
nalist that Cuba was, and always had leenb 7*'e*a'eO to 'eaQJ
344. See Segrera, supra note 12, at 3N4.
345. See Castro Mariño, supra note 108, at 62; see also discussion supra note
108.
346. Sweig & Bustamante, supra note 108, at 114.
347. See ROY, supra note 41, at 37. 7Nationalization5 is the government’s tak-
ing of property with adequate, effective, prompt compensation. See Ashby, su-
pra note 20, at 414. 7Confiscation5 is the government’s taking of property with-
out such compensation. See ROY, supra note 41, at 37 (discussing the signifi-
cance and meaning of the term 7confiscated5 as defined by the Helms-Burton
Act, and noting that the 7legislators found it advisable to offer a sort of detailed
glossary in section 4 (3Definitions’).5). See also Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, supra note 97.
348. See Noumoff, supra note 97, at 955.
349. See Ashby, supra note 20, at 420. See also discussion supra note 254.
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a 'eaHistiQ settHement^5350 Scholars have since argued that the
only reason claims remain unsettled is because the United
8tates’ &Htimate olIeQti%e is not QHaims 'esoH&tionb l&t tJe o%e'`
throw of the Castro regime and the return of Cuba as a neocolo-
nial U.S. outpost.351 The full and immediate recognition of Cuba
as a sovereign state would amount to a full-stop reversal in U.S.
policy, but it would also signal that the United States is ready
anO jiHHinL to ente' into tJose 7'eaHistiQ5 talks of settlement en-
visioned years ago.
Z&'tJe'b tJe 4niteO 8tates neeO not le so jo''ieO alo&t 7so`
QiaHism5 in its laQkha'O^ 6Je *ost-ColdWar era is over, and Fidel
Castro himself once aOmitteOb 73otnJe C&lan moOeH Ooesn’t e%en
work for us anymore. . . .’5352 Cast'o’s aOmission is not so m&QJ
a rejection of the Cuban Revolution as it is a recalibration—in-
tenOeO to aQknojHeOLe 7tJat &nOe' 3tJe C&lan SoOeH’ tJe state
Jas m&QJ too liL a 'oHe in tJe eQonomiQ HiMe oM tJe Qo&nt'h^5353
Since the collapse of the Soviet 4nion fanO its 7MinanQiaH &nOe'`
j'itinL5 oM Cast'o’s 7aO%ent&'ism5d anO tJe s&lse(&ent MaHHinL
through of Venezuelan support, Castro and his revolutionaries
Ja%e 7st'&LLHeO to enLinee' its s&'%i%aHobn5 siLnaHinL tJat it mah
be high time for a shift in economic, political, and diplomatic
strategy.354 By extension, now is the time to rethink approaches
towards outstanding claims resolution and settlement.
B. Solution: The United States and Cuba Should Commit to
Three Tiers of Settlement Mechanisms
This section will propose and evaluate the merits of a new
three-tier framework, one which simultaneously incorporates
350. See Abraham F. Lowenthal, Cuba: Time for a Change, 20 FOREIGNPOL’Y
65, 77 (1975) (7Such a settlement would involve not only recognition of the
principle of compensation (which Cuba has already paid to several European
countries) but some net transfer of funds from Cuba to the U.S. government,
with [the U.S.] government acting as trustee for the expropriated firms.5).
351. See Segrera, supra note 12, at 3N4. See also Noumoff, supra note 97, at
955.
352. See Jeffrey Goldberg, Fidel: ‘Cuban Model Doesn’t Even Work for Us An-
ymore,’ ATLANTIC (Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/ar-
chive/2010/09/fidel-cuban-model-doesnt-even-work-for-us-anymore/62602/.
See also Daniel Fisk & Courtney R. Perez, Managed Engagement: The Cast of
Castro’s Cuba, 42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 47, 47N48 (2009).
353. See id.
354. See Fisk & Perez, supra note 352, at 48. See also FEINBERG, supra note
3, at 50N52; see also discussion supra note 304.
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the more meritorious elements of existing proposals (primarily,
the Feinberg Proposal) while balancing these elements against
themajor flaws that this Note has exposed. The first tier consists
of restitution of nationalized assets in Cuba, including improved
and unimproved real property, which would stimulate the Cu-
ban economy. The second tier consists of bilateral trade agree-
ments, including development rights and tax incentives, which
would further accelerate the Cuban economy. The third tier con-
sists of direct compensation, including partial interest pay-
ments, made possible by the stimulation and acceleration of
C&la’s eQonomh fanOb as a Qonse(&enQeb tJe C&lan Lo%e'nment’s
improved foreign exchange balances).
1. Restitution
In light of the above-noted flaws, and despite the cries of cynics
to the contrary, restitution remains a viable option for settling
outstanding claims.355 The main reasons for this are twofold:
Cuba cannot afford a single lump-sum payout,356 and more than
eighty percent of FCSC-certified claims stem from expropriation
of commercial, not residential, lands and debts.357 The argument
in chief against restitution has been that this method of settle-
ment jo&HO 7Ois*HaQe5 *e'sons oQQ&*hinL 'esiOentiaH *'o*e'`
ties.358 As it turns out, this concern is for the most part un-
founded, as the majority of the properties that would be resti-
tuted are commercial ones.359
Restitution of commercial lands would provide effective means
to settle a substantial portion of the outstanding claims, allevi-
ating the Cuban government of the burden of paying in cash
tJose *'o*e'ties’ neLotiateO %aH&es^ 9estit&tion aHso *'o%iOes tJe
Cuban government with a unique opportunity to reinvigorate
355. See CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 202N204 (noting the 7lim-
ited role of restitution5); FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 4; and Ashby, supra note
20, at 413N14 (failing to mention restitution as an option).
356. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 28N30.
357. See Larry Luxner, Mauricio Tamargo: Settling Cuba Claims Won’t Be
Easy, 13 Cuba News 8, 8 (2005).
358. See CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 203 (7There is also the
significant moral problem presented by the possibility of displacing ordinary
Cubans who have been living and working within the existing structure of Cu-
ban society and can hardly be faulted for their current circumstances. It would
be highly counterproductive to create a system that would displace these per-
sons.5).
359. See Luxner, supra note 357, at 8.
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commercial properties and arable lands that have been chroni-
cally underproductive.360 6Jis is QaHHeO a 7jin-jin^5
Further, without restitution as a main mechanism for claims
resolution, Cuba stands little chance to adequately, effectively,
or promptly compensate claimants for their losses.361 As the
Creighton Report,362 the Ashby Proposal,363 and the Feinberg
Proposal364 all concede, Cuba suffers from a substantially dete-
riorated economic condition, one which would not allow for more
tJan 7token5 Qompensation in the near long term.365 Restitution
provides a route to achieve a higher claim value to settlement
value ratio, and contrary to the widely disseminated but faulty
ass&m*tion tJat 'estit&tion jo&HO 7Ieo*a'Oige5 tJe 'iLJts oM Q&'`
rent owners,366 the 20 percent or less of claims that relate to res-
idential properties could be excluded from this first mechanism.
The fact that many of the commercial properties underlying the
claims are now owned, controlled, or jointly operated by the Cu-
ban government further strengthens the case for restitution.
2. Bilateral Trade Agreements
The second proposed mechanism involves a modified lump-
sum plus direct trade agreement, akin to the agreements
360. See FEINBERG, supra note 3, at 200 (noting that Cuba suffers from a
7[b]adly depleted capital stock and infrastructure, subpar national savings and
investment rates, and low productivity, especially in agriculture5) (emphasis
added).
361. See Daniel P. Faust, American Investment in Cuban Real Estate: Close
but No Cigar, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 369, 386N87 (2009).
362. See CREIGHTONUNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 103 (7Despite an apparent
record of compliance with past lump-sum property claim settlement agree-
ments with foreign governments, Cuba’s ability to engage in a similar arrange-
ment with the United States is doubtful. In light of the large value of United
States claims against Cuba and Cuba’s poor economic situation, no meaningful
lump sum payment is feasible for United States claims as a whole.5).
363. See Ashby, supra note 20, at 427 (arguing that because of Cuba’s poor
economic condition, any 7[s]ettlement would probably be paid pro rata5).
364. See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 7 (7The economic costs alone—direct
costs of compensation and disruptions to economic activity—could be prohibi-
tive.5).
365. See Faust, supra note 361, at 386N87 (7Unfortunately, unless payment
is delayed for a substantial period of time, Cuba’s economic condition will not
allow more than token compensation to the former owners.5).
366. See id. at 387 (7Hopefully, the resolution of claims of former land-owners
will be through compensation instead of through the return of property so that
the ownership rights of current and future owners do not remain in jeopardy.5).
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reached between Cuba and Canada, Great Britain, France,
Spain, and Switzerland, respectively.367 If restitution is the pri-
mary mechanism of claims settlement, and that mechanism is
utilized to wipe out 80 percent of the total value of all FCSC-
related claims (approximately $1.8 billion USD in principal),368
that leaves a balance of only $360 million USD, which is on par
with the alleged total value of all claims settled in the Spanish-
Cuban accord.369 Although the Spanish claims were purportedly
settled for only $40 million USD,370 there is no question that
Cuba is more likely to entertain a $360 million USD lump-sum
claim than a $1.8 billion USD claim.
Just like Cuba did with Switzerland, France, and Spain, it
could be inclined to enter into a lump-sum settlement agreement
with U.S. national, Cuban American exile, and Cuban national
claimants if there were either direct or indirect trade provisions
attached to the deal.371 Wn aOOitionb Oes*ite C&la’s *oo' eQonomiQ
conditions, the small island nation has emerged as a global med-
iQaH *oje'Jo&seb att'aQtinL miHHions oM OoHHa's oM 7meOiQaH tour-
ism5 l&siness e%e'h hea'^372 Cuba is poised to wield its medical
clout as a bargaining chip, perhaps helping to provide the United
States with an ironic answer to its current medical crisis. Fur-
ther, academics across various epistemological fields have ob-
se'%eO tJat C&la is 'eaOh to 7tJink Hike Qa*itaHists l&t Qontin&e
leinL soQiaHistsb5 jJiQJ *'o%iOes at Heast *a'tiaH 'eHieM to tJose
Americans clinging to Cold War fears.373 Again, Fidel Castro
himself once aOmitteO tJat tJe 7C&lanmoOeH Ooesn’t e%enjo'k5
anymore, suggesting that the Cuban political hierarchy is ready
367. See supra Part II.
368. See Neyfakh, supra note 22.
369. See CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 102 (7The total value of
Spanish claims was estimated at $350 million [USD].5).
370. See id. (7Spanish claims were settled for around $40 million [USD].5).
371. See Gordon, supra note 271, at 466 (7The actual increased trade with
France and Spain, as well as the direct trade provisions in the Swiss accord,
additionally illustrate that Cuba has not agreed to any settlement of claims
merely to resolve legitimate claims for property deprivations, but that the set-
tlements are considered quid pro quo for the acquisition of needed commodities
or foreign exchange.5).
372. See Julie M. Feinsilver, Cuba as a “World Medical Power”: The Politics
of Symbolism, 24 LAT. AM. RES. REV. 1 (1989).
373. See P. Sean Brotherton, “We Have to Think like Capitalists but Continue
Being Socialists”: Medicalized Subjectivities, Emergent Capital, and Socialist
Entrepreneurs in Post-Soviet Cuba, 35 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 259 (2008).
2018] Outstanding American Property Claims in Cuba 607
to evolve and adapt to new modes of economic modeling and so-
cial planning.374
3. Direct Compensation
It stands to reason that the second mechanism just proposed,
bilateral trade agreements, and the third mechanism, direct
compensation, go hand in hand. If the United States and all par-
ties involved agree to the three-tier settlement framework pro-
posed here, Cuba would gain a massive injection of economic,
technological, and human capital, reinvigorating the economy,
spurring growth and development, and igniting a Cuban renais-
sance—an economic one, poised to transform Cuban society writ
large.375
With that same injection of capital stimulated by renewed bi-
Hate'aH t'aOeb C&la’s eQonomiQ QonOition jo&HO improve expo-
nentially, increasing its foreign reserves by multiples.376 With
the renewed availability of cash-on-hand, Cuba would have a
better chance of settling claims through this third proposed
mechanism—direct compensation. Although the claims left to be
settled would be minimal, imagine the irony of a Cuban Ameri-
can in Miami or New York receiving a check from the Cuban
government.
CONCLUSION
The history of outstanding claims resulting from the Castro
nationalizations is a long and tortured one.377 Despite calls to
the contrary, the Cuban government has been—and remains—
ready to enter into realistic and meaningful claims resolution
negotiations.378 Anh insin&ation tJat C&la 7'eM&ses5 to neLotiate
the claims ignores decades of precedent, including the five cases
discussed in Part II.379 The recent warming of relations between
the United States and Cuba380 provides a novel and timely op-
portunity to reexamine these long-outstanding claims. But in do-
ing so, international leaders representing any of the interested
parties must be mindful of the major flaws of most proposals to
374. See Goldberg, supra note 352.
375. See FEINBERG, supra note 3, at 202, 212N21.
376. See id.
377. See supra Part I.
378. See supra Part II.
379. See supra Part II.
380. See Charting a New Course in Cuba, supra note 24.
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date, including under-inclusivity, the issue of ex parte valua-
tions, and archaic U.S. foreign policy attitudes and objectives.381
The three-tier framework proposed in this Note is but one of the
myriad of options available to negotiators. At the very least, it
provides a much-needed update—a 7YeOanken5 ei*e'iment, if
you will.
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